NEW TIMES

The Year of Judgment as mirrored in events and people

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1991 YEAR OF JUDGEMENT





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NEW TIMES

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From our mailbag

■ I am 50 years old. For 25 years I have been a subscriber to *New Times*. This year I have not received eight issues of your magazine. I live and work far in the North where it is impossible to buy *New Times*. Sometimes I get very angry about this outrage, and sometimes I lose heart. One of my friends, a teacher, did not subscribe to *New Times* for the next year, saying it is expensive. But is it not expensive to buy a bottle of home-brew for 50 rubles? It is simply preposterous. I don't care about the price. What is disgusting is that my *New Times* issues are lost somewhere.

I understand that you can't help me. I am simply complaining and I apologize for this.

Vassily Bilachuk
Republic of Komi

■ Your magazine No. 45/91 published an article *Talkov is dead but the Pamyat (Memory) lives on* by Evgeny Anokhin. I have several questions for the author of this "piece of art."

What connected Talkov with the Memory Society? Nothing. Somebody once saw the singer beside Dmitry Vasiliev, a leader of the Memory Society. But this does not indicate anything. It is like accusing a journalist who interviews a criminal of ties with the mafia. Talkov became a "political figure" when he was still alive, not after his death – whether you like it or not. Talkov is a hero. He sang what he thought and was not afraid to do so.

Now about the murder. It is not an achievement of *glasnost* but an unfortunate thing that TV showed a wounded man being carried on a stretcher. Instead of doing everything to save a human life some cameramen showed us how death came. We have no compassion for others – only idle curiosity and a desire for profit.

In conclusion, I would like to ask journalists not to relish the details of Igor Talkov's death. Give rest to his soul. Spare his dear and near ones. Don't aggravate their suffering with your articles.

Olga Klimova
Chita

■ I would like to express my indignation over some articles published by your magazine. Why are you so unceremonious? You already humiliate ordinary and unfortunate people who suffer from people like you. I was exasperated by Tatiana Ivanova's article *The hot summer of 1991*. How can she humiliate her fellow-travellers in commuter train? Does it mean the time has come when you have to be cautious while reading the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya?* Does it mean you should be afraid of people spying on you and informing against you, as it was in the past? Why can't I read *Sovetskaya Rossiya* to which I have subscribed for 20 years? I also read your magazine and other newspapers so that I have some basis for comparison. I have a clear head and do not need the "educational" articles of your Ivanova or Nuikin, who accuses former Russian Communist Party leader Polozkov of things he himself is guilty of. Nuikin differs from Polozkov in one way – he threw away his party card. You should not constantly repeat that we have supplied and continue to supply our best brains to Israel. Don't fool the people. The best brains have not flown to Israel. They remain in our country.

Y. Chebotareva, never a member of the Communist Party
Noginsk

■ I enjoyed reading the articles about L. Ron Hubbard (Nos

Is it worth defending the riot police?

■ Valery Ivanov, the leader of the Unity movement, has been arrested in Vilnius. I visited Moscow together with him and took part in meetings held in the Russian government's building. We spoke in favour of an early ratification of a treaty between Lithuania and Russia. The absence of diplomatic protection of persons who have not adopted Lithuanian citizenship leads to the arbitrary rule of authorities with impunity.

Several days after his return from Moscow my friend was arrested and is now being kept in custody. He is accused of instigating spontaneous mass riots on January 8 (it was the second day after the first price rises and people themselves took to the streets; there was no need to call them to do that). Valery Ivanov is called almost the main participant in the seizure of the TV tower, though it is known that this was done by the KGB's Alpha group, whereas Valery simply worked there as a TV operator earning half-wages to provide for himself and his son. The widower, who has a five-year-old son, was thrown into prison under far-fetched pretexts, though he signed a written agreement not to leave Vilnius. Valery Ivanov boldly defended the interests of ordinary people regardless of their nationality. For three years the mass media of Lithuania tried to represent the bright, truly people's leader as a bogy and instil the image of "red" danger in the public mind. The action taken by Lithuanian authorities against Valery Ivanov can later be taken against other former Soviet people.

Valery Penkov
Vilnius, Lithuania

■ What can be said about the Unity organization in Lithuania, the Intermovement in Latvia and the Interfront in Estonia? These organizations say they defend the non-native citizens against the chauvinism and nationalism of the native population. In fact, it is not so. Of course, there are different people within these organizations. On the whole, movements express the discontent and irritation of the people who moved to the Baltic republics.

"Talkov sang what he thought"

***New Times* is more useful and cheaper than home-brew**

The best brains have not emigrated

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by V. Fedorov

48–50/91). However, in the December issue of Reader's Digest I read Richard Bihar's article entitled *Scientology: the dangerous cult emerges in the foreground*, in which the same science is described from a diametrically opposite point of view.

Couldn't you explain why the approach to Hubbard's activity is so different or should Richard Bihar be reckoned among "many scientists" who "consider Hubbard's ideas absurd," as the author of the *New Times* articles wrote.

I think your reply will be of interest to all readers of the magazine to which, incidentally, I have subscribed for the coming year in spite of my rather modest student grant.

Alexander Zelenkovsky
Moscow

■ I read with interest K. Krizhanovsky's item in the Mailbag section (No. 24/91). He noted the strengthening of the union between the "Orthodox Church, the party mafia and conservative forces." I do not know the stand taken by the Orthodox Church. But, as a rule, "patriots" boast of their allegiance to the church. I have no doubt that a considerable section of conservative forces belongs to the Communist Party. The alignment between chauvinists and the military is particularly disquieting. The military-patriotic association *Otechestvo* (Fatherland) recently put out the book *Black Hundred and Red Hundred* by Victor Ostretsov. It is sold in Moscow along with chauvinist publications.

Article 74 of the Russian Federation's criminal code, which bans chauvinist propaganda, is violated with impunity. This indicates that certain influential circles not only connive with the chauvinists but also support this movement. Anti-chauvinist barriers against the fomenting of ethnic discord should therefore be created in the republics. Of the 45 anti-Semitic periodicals, (their list has been made public by the *Yevreiskaya Gazeta* (Jewish Newspaper), 26 are published in Moscow and four more are distributed in the capital.

In this respect there is a striking contrast between Moscow and Kiev, where a conference on problems of Ukrainian-Jewish relations was held recently. The conference was addressed by scholars from various cities of our country as well as from Israel, the United States, Canada and Germany.

Another means of counteracting chauvinism was the book *Anti-Semitism: Who Benefits?* put out by the 50th anniversary of the Babi Yar tragedy. It contains the hitherto unpublished documents exposing state and other types of anti-Semitism. The book shows how Judophobia, which spread under the guise of criticism of Zionism, was caught up by chauvinistic writers and grew into provocations staged by *Pamyat* society and other neo-fascist organizations. It was brought out by the scientific information organization *Poisk* (Search). Its address: 35–B, Mezhigorskaya St., 252054, Kiev–54.

A. Naiman,
secretary of the association for anti-chauvinist action
Kiev

***Compiled by* Tatiana Chernova**

People came here from various parts of the country. They lived here for a long time. They did not understand and then did not want to do so that they live in another country. When they went to the Baltic republics they did not take the trouble to think what they were doing, where they were going, and no one even tried to explain this to them. When the process of national awakening began in the Baltic republics, these people did not want to accept the historical realities, and it is already their fault. They did not notice that they had overstepped the line beyond which their actions became anti-constitutional, illegal, and thus falling under articles of the criminal code. Beginning in the summer of last year the members of Intermovements have supported violent actions against the lawful authorities, directly participated in these actions, opposing the very existence of the Baltic republics recognized by the world community.

The fault of these people is that they have intensified the opposition between the Russian communities and the Baltic nations. The Russian communities are, indeed, not in the best condition now. In this respect the Interfront, the Unity and the Intermovement share the blame together with the Union government, the army, the Communist Party and the KGB.

It sounds nice: "Let's defend the riot police," "Let's defend leaders of the movement." However, people must bear responsibility for what they do.

I also belong to these people and sometimes feel despondent, too. However, I have found the strength to understand and accept what is taking place here.

Sergei Boyarov

Riga, Latvia

YEAR OF JUDGEMENT

The year was like one of those days which, as legend has it, were the Days of Creation



Everything in this year has turned topsy-turvy. The drawn-out *perestroika* surreptitiously melted away to yield in the political vocabulary to the threatening word – "coup." Throughout the year destiny played with the country as its whims took it. The scales of history teetered from freedom to dictatorship and back. Armour rolled into Moscow twice. This year, which began with bloodshed in Vilnius and continued with more bloodshed in Karabakh and Ossetia has climaxed with bloodshed in Tbilisi.

A nightmarish year this, one of blood and depression, very much the Day or Year of Judgement, one during which destiny was decided. The people passed judgement and the once omnipotent Communist Party vanished from the political scene. When the republican parliaments gave their blessing to the new Commonwealth of Independent States, that put paid to the USSR, which is now no longer on the world's political map. All barriers in the way of reform are down. Horizons are as clear and endless as on the First Day of Creation. What will we be able to create now that we are free? How will we use our freedom?



Drawing by Igor Shein

VP (Vox populi) is Prof. Boris Grushin's public opinion poll

THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM – THE YEAR'S BASIC RESULT

The outgoing year has been packed with international developments that have had a serious impact on the destiny of the human race. Which do you think the Number One highlight?

The VP polling showed 32 percent for the abolition of the August 1991 putsch coupled with the victory of the democratic trend in Soviet society;
11 percent for the USSR's overall crisis;
6 percent for the Gulf War, which demonstrated new forms of international relations;
4 percent for the end of the Cold War and rapproachment with the West;
6 percent for other external political events including the changes in Eastern Europe and Germany;
2 percent for the developments in Yugoslavia.

Of the total number polled 6 percent declined to answer, while 33 dithered.

Summing up the international results of the outgoing year we see that nearly half of Russia's population named processes and events associated with affairs at home. Note, though, that this attitude hardly indicates an egocentrism or a fixation on our own problems. Rather is this a distinct understanding of the real significance of what occurred in the world in 1991, i.e., developments that have triggered off the collapse of the Communist system.

One more result is noteworthy. This is that 39 percent (note that) declined or were hard put to give any definite answer, which adds up to one out of three. And they call us the world's most politicized society!

An All-Russian public opinion poll taken on the eve of 1992. The survey covered 1,916 persons. December 19, 1991.



Kronid Lyubarsky

Will Mikhail Gorbachev resign as President and when? It is high time to discuss the results of his six and a half years in power, for it is clear already that whatever might happen in last few days of the outgoing year, nothing will change the irreversible course of events. The epoch ended even before the man who symbolized it had a chance to step down.

A death sentence to the system

It is not easy to write about the Gorbachev epoch: now that this man is really in a very trying situation, one feels like thanking him for all that he had done for our freedom. He is not entirely to blame for our inability to use that freedom. It is not really important that Gorbachev was advocating freedom very often contrary to his own will – after all, it is the final result that matters in history, and this result has exceeded all expectations: the Gorbachev epoch has become an epoch of the global collapse of totalitarianism and the imperial idea. As Mikhail Gorbachev disappears into the pages of history, accompanying him is the Twentieth Century. The outgoing President has secured himself a place in the Pantheon of outstanding statesmen.

However, Gorbachev has selected his career as politician himself and he cannot count on the old rule *aut bene, aut nihil* being applied to him. Any false step made by a politician, either out of his evil will or incompetence, affects too many human lives and fates. This very special measure of responsibility makes a politician similar to a surgeon or a designer of a nuclear reactor. That is why one really should not accuse those who say bitter, as well as nice things about the President at this difficult time of being ungrateful. Excessive loyalty to Gorbachev will inevitably overshadow the memory of those who differ from him in just one aspect – by never being the Person of the Year – for example, that gang-raped Armenian woman who had been burned alive during the pogroms in Sumgait (does anyone remember her name now?) – after all, her horrible finale is also on the President's balance sheet.

When we speak about the epoch's good and bad things, we do not pass any judgement, we just try to see what the Twenty First Century is going to be like.

GORBACHEV

Year of Judgement

The President has gone, so has the Soviet Union

Gorbachev and his initial followers are incorrectly referred to as "architects of *perestroika.*" They had never been architects. Marx was right when he said that the difference between the worst architect and the best bee was that the former always had a plan before setting down to work. What Gorbachev and his entourage regarded as a plan (the vision expressed in Gorbachev's first book, *Perestroika)* had nothing to do with reality. It was an instinctive understanding of the necessity of change, a premonition of troubles to come and the desire to save themselves and the nation from those troubles. There was a feeling of shame for the disgrace that the senile system demonstrated to the whole world, and the ambitious desire – a very good and sincere desire – to leave a good memory after themselves, for the disgraceful example of the posthumous fate of Stalin and Brezhnev was before everybody to see.

One thing was lacking, though: a clear knowledge of reality. Almost two years after the reforms had begun, Yakovlev admitted that when they started their drive, neither Gorbachev nor he had any assessment of the scope of the problems facing them.

This is staggering. The whole world, prominent political scientists, sociologists, philosophers, who watched the evolution of the Soviet monster from the outside, had long passed a death sentence on the "socialist choice." Dissidents inside the country, whose only source of information was their own experience and common sense, arrived at the same conclusion. As for the leaders of the great country, who had at their disposal an unprecedented secret service machine which controlled all information channels, and took pride in their knowing all about how things went in the country, they actually **knew next to nothing.**

New words, old rules

Political leaders of the totalitarian state were themselves victims of totalitarianism. Deprived of the necessity to compete with their political opponents in terms of knowledge, or competence, or the ability to band a competent team, or flexibility of mind, or ability to establish contacts between the rulers and the ruled, feeling the political will of the latter, they eliminated the process of natural selection in politics. The only field where their knowledge was superb was the art of *apparat* intrigues, and Gorbachev was one master of that art. As long as *perestroika* was confined to *apparat* reshuffles and phasing out of the old-generation cadres, Gorbachev's actions were excellent and he did not make a single mistake. "The Yeltsin affair" was not a Gorbachev mistake either: Gorbachev could not have reasonably foreseen that Yeltsin would change the rules of the game and start acting in a manner to which the *apparat* was not quite accustomed.

Gorbachev was very energetic when he carried out what was called a "revolution of second secretaries," firing the old cadres and replacing them with more vigorous ones from the follow-up echelon. Those new leaders were expected to become the tools of renewal. I am ready to assume that many of the Gorbachev appointees shared his desire to feed the people, to let people forget fear, to allow peopole travel abroad – in short, they were quite sincere in their desire to improve the nation's life.

There was one thing they could not understand, however: there would be no changes in this country as long as people were to be fed and allowed to do anything. Simply speaking, they did not know the ABC of democracy or have the vaguest idea of how democratic political structures and free-market economic mechanisms worked. Gorbachev knew as much, if not less, as his team. After he emerged at the helm, he nonetheless preserved the outlook of a regional party boss. For a regional-level politician energy means more than knowledge. And if such a politician is an honest person, there is nothing more one can want. However, a head of state has to be something more.

It was strange to hear Gorbachev say that "unemployment cannot be accepted here," "only the best features" could be borrowed from capitalism, already after he had recognized the need to switch over to a free-market economy. Gorbachev just could not understand that an economic system was a single whole, and he could not take only those features that he liked out of it, for the bad features of an economic system are only a continuation of its merits. Actually, Gorbachev was obsessed with the old idea of creating an ideal society in which "things would go right." He had no doubts that such a society was possible to create. The only difference was that "the architect of *perestroika*" intended to build the structure of renewed communism out of capitalist bricks and on the foundation of shared human values, not class values. There was nothing new to this thinking. The rhetoric was new, but the rules remained the same.

A history of being late

Incompetence, the inability to analyze the situation professionally or at least to lend an attentive ear to a professional's advice were the main reasons behind Gorbachev's all well-known mistakes. Gorbachev's history in the past few years is a history of stiff resistance to all really radical changes. He resisted the introduction of private ownership, and especially private ownership of land, he used all resources to derail any attempt at a radical economic reform and opposed the Communist Party's removal from its monopolistic power. He devoted himself wholly to the confrontation with the independence-thirsty republics, to the attempts to preserve the centre, which was becoming more and more of the symbol of everything that was hated by the peoples of the big multinational state.

Each time Gorbachev had to retreat, but it was too late, and his concessions could not really change much.

Actually, the very idea of *perestroika* as an attempt to reform what can't be reformed, was the ultimate expression of

Gorbachev's incompetence. If initially one could suspect that the word *perestroika* was only an euphemism used to mislead the conservatives and keep them in the dark about the real intentions of the new policy, after the August developments it became clear that Mikhail Gorbachev had been sincere all the way. It was his strategy, not tactics. Only a very convinced person could speak about the loyalty to the socialist choice and the necessity of a deeper reform of the Communist Party after the August developments. Only a very convinced person could continue the incantations about the Union when the Empire had virtually completely broken up. This gives a credit to Gorbachev's ideological fortitude, but in certain situations devotion to a cause turns into political blindness.

Finally, the pressure of events made Gorbachev – too late once again – speak about the necessity of a resolute rejection of the system we have inherited from the Bolsheviks. It was not clear, however, what he included in the concept of "the system." One thing is obvious – he did not include himself into it.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev was a product and the final defender of that system. He wanted to do good to the nation, but on the condition that he would be the only source of good-doing. He called his *perestroika* revolution, and the press called it revolution from above. The revolution from above was to be carried out in line with the principle of democratic centralism. That is why Gorbachev needed the centre so much. He regarded as personal offence any attacks against the leading role of the CPSU "which had initiated *perestroika*," and later against the Empire and the principle of "strong centre – strong republics." He even interpreted the August coup primarily as an action against "the President and his family."

He failed to realize that the demolition of the system made it necessary to get rid of him – not Gorbachev the man, but Gorbachev the General–Secretary–turned–President. The initiator of the revolution from above, he was scared of the revolution from below.

History gave Gorbachev a unique chance to get rid of his General Secretary complex. However, he did not once use that chance and declare himself a man resolutely breaking with the old system. The Chernobyl disaster, the First Congress of People's Deputies, the 500-Day Programme, combined with extreme presidential powers granted to him by parliament, the June 1991 parliamentary demarche of Premier Pavlov and KGB chief Kryuchkov, violence in Sumgait, Baku, Tbilisi and Vilnius... – the list of missed opportunities is endless. If he had acted after the forceful quelling of a rally in Tbilisi in April 1989 as energetically as he did after Mathias Rust landed on the Red Square, Gorbachev would have promoted the preservation of his dear Union more than by making a dozen tearful speeches on TV. When he chose to keep silent, he started to be thought of as an accomplice in a crime, no matter whether it was true or not. As for the Union, it seems that the bloody April in Tbilisi was the point of no return, beyond which no restoration of the *status quo* became possible.

Even four months ago Gorbachev still had a chance to demonstrate that he had stopped being a part of the system. He could have come to the revolutionary White House straight from the night airport to which he returned from his Crimean captivity. He could have addressed the crowds outside the White House and overstripped Yeltsin by declaring his decision to terminate Party membership and outlaw the CPSU as an organization resorting to unconstitutional activities. He could have declared recognition of independence of all former republics of the USSR, he could have shown that a **different** president had returned to a **different** country.

But the President remained the same, and that sealed his fate.

They gave us freedom, but we wanted more

Our shortcomings are not necessarily a continuation of our merits. Sometimes it is vice versa. The indecision and vaccillations, the inability to take decisions in unfamiliar situations, defined the main thing for which Gorbachev will always be remembered with gratitude: he brought to life new political forces which soon started acting on their own. The existence of independent political forces meant a death sentence for the system.

These forces were the product of the *glasnost* policy which initially had very little to do with the freedom of speech. I think that if in 1985 Gorbachev could have foreseen the consequences of his policy, he would have thought twice before taking his foot from the brakes. At that time he still believed that the press was "a loyal assistant of the Party," this time in the cause of *perestroika*, and it was on the help of the press that Gorbachev relied when carrying out his sweeping change of Party cadres. He received the help he wanted.

But it was not the only thing that he received. Liberal intellectuals, nationalist movements, the new workers' movement did not want to join the legion of Party allies and declared themselves to be independent political forces. Gorbachev was still able to stop or at least delay this process, but once out, these political forces were hard to put back, unless Gorbachev resorted to brutal force. Increasingly, the General Secretary started looking like a young magician who cannot control the action of his own charms.

Meanwhile the appearance of an experienced magician could still reverse the process. We thought we were free, but we were not. We believed that the revolution from above had given us freedom, and when we started to doubt this, we were immediately accused of being ungrateful and of having forgotten who allowed us to read the outspoken press and to travel abroad. It was not real freedom that we received, though, for he who gives freedom can always take it back whenever he pleases.

We took the real freedom in August outside the Russian parliament building. We have nobody to thank for this freedom – not Gorbachev, and not even Yeltsin, who owes us as much as we owe him. This is the main significance of the August revolution.

This revolution is unique in one sense: it was history's first **legitimate** revolution not against the lawful power, but in support of it.

Ironically, the coup that touched off the

revolution was legitimate too (not **lawful**, mind you, but **legitimate**). The putschists were power themselves, while the removal of the country's leader "for health reasons" in the Communist paradygm is as normal and legitimate as the removal of a prime minister by parliamentary vote of no confidence in a democracy. If the Soviet people and the world never doubted the legitimacy of Leonid Brezhnev's ascent to power, why should things have been different for Yanayev? The putsch, spearheaded against Gorbachev the man, was, ironically again, intended to protect the policy pursued by Gorbachev the General Secretary.

Diarchy

Thus the August revolution was essentially a clash of two equally legitimate powers. It was the surfacing of the long-existing **diarchy.** The diarchy which started with the "war of laws" adopted by federal and republican parliaments, finally, took shape when Boris Yeltsin was elected President of Russia. After that the surfacing of the crisis became only a matter of time.

As they woke up in the morning of August 19, the people had an opportunity to choose from two legitimate powers. The old legitimate Communist power, or the emerging democratic legitimate power. The legitimate power of the federal centre, or the legitimate power of the republics. The legitimate power of the General Secretary, or the legitimate power of the President of Russia. The choice made by the people was unexpected for the coup leaders: they were not prepared for it, that's why they failed.

I am not sure that the August revolution could have been successful if it had been carried out not in support of, but **against** the legitimate power. The popular hero Yeltsin, yet not the President or head of parliament, would have hardly solicited much following had he called for the storming of the Kremlin or the CPSU Central Committee headquarters. Society was mature enough to ignore such calls – it had learned lessons from its bitter past.

The August meant the end of the Gorbachev era, no matter how his life is going to develop now.

The revolution brought us real freedom, but has not yet resulted in the affirmation of a democratic society and democratic power. The legitimate democratic power, which the revolution had saved, has yet to become a really democratic power. Its structures are vastly inherited form the past, and people who make up the present bodies of power have until recently been an organic part of the old regime.

The processes going on in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Russian provinces, the Chechen republic, Moldavia, Moscow and the Russian White House itself show that the old system has not yet lost the ability to regenerate in new forms. One should not be lulled by the thought that there is no turning back to the past now. Society is infected with the Communist virus and if no urgent measures are taken, recuperation may take long (if the infected society survives at all). Society must learn the bitter lesson that history has taught Gorbachev.

The Biblical words on the Kremlin walls

Today any step aimed at the overcoming of the seventy-year-old legacy of Bolshevism touches off a wave of warnings against "witch-hunt." The word first used by Gorbachev on August 23 as he addressed the Russian parliament has a meaning that is very often overlooked by those who use it, and this meaning is a lot different from what is usually thought the word "witch-hunt" means.

The witch is a phantom existing in the delirious mind of the hunter. To gratify his fantasies, the witch-hunter kills and tortures innocent people. The campaign to unmask the "wreckers" in the 1930s and "cosmopolitans" in the 1940s and 1950s, were essentially examples of witch-hunt. As for the communist ideology, which has been cultivated in us for several decades, it can hardly be called a phantom. When we accuse each other of Bolshevism, don't we thus acknowledge the reality of the danger?

I would like to give you a very close historical analogy: the fate of another political idea and another party which had been declared, and in effect, had been criminal. This is the Nazi party of Germany, the NSDAP. If some people would think the analogy is out of place, let them name to me the crime the CPSU had not committed to deserve to be called a criminal party. No such crime is there to cite.

The objection that the NSDAP was found guilty by an international court, and there has been no trial over the CPSU is irrelevant: the same arguments were used by retired procurator Shekhovtsov, who filed a legal suit against Stalin being called a criminal without a court verdict. History itself has condemned Stalin and the CPSU and the fiery words – *mene, tekel, upharsin* – are already clearly seen on the walls of the Kremlin.

Denazification

The process of denazification carried out in Germany after the war was not a witch-hunt, no matter what excesses and difficulties it included. It helped the country to cleanse itself of the Nazi filth and to become a modern civilized state. No such process has been carried out in this country, but it is clearly necessary.

People who would be scared by my words and start speaking about "18 million honest Communists" must remember that the number of "honest Nazis" also ran into millions. Denazifi-

cation did not mean that all of them were held criminally liable. Only 1,167 people were condemned as major criminals in Germany, 23,000 people were found guilty of smaller crimes, and 150,000 people were condemned on minor charges, while the total number of cases in the three Western zones of Germany was 3.6 million. The rest of NSDAP members were regarded as innocent or followers.

It was not the number of people condemned, but the very process of cleansing and its openness that really mattered. As for the "18 million honest communists," let each of them condemn himself – at least for having let the political intriguers refer to him in order to facilitate their egoistic political ends.

I am well aware of the tremendous difficulties associated with the "denazification" process in this country, and I understand that this problem has to be looked into by professionals. I hope I will be able to discuss this matter separately. Meanwhile let me quote the words the prominent German philosopher, Karl Jaspers, said in 1965:

"The main problem is whether the Nazi state would be formally pronounced criminal.

"A criminal state is such a state which does not in principle create and respect legality. What is called law and what such a state generates in its legislative process only serves as a means of oppression, not something the state honours and observes. The criminal state wants to change people by force and to conquer mankind.

"This political principle must be repeated over and over again: the realization of the necessity of a moral and political revolution after 1945, the unlimited desire to stop the continuity of the criminal state, the understanding that something new must be created, and the desire to create it – all these are prerequisites for us if we are to have a future."

I believe that today we have every right to apply these words to our country.



Drawings from the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet (Sweden)

Three miracles

Christoph Bertram,
diplomatic correspondent for Die Zeit (Hamburg)

The fact that great politicians have once to vacate the world political arena is as undoubtable as the truth that gratitude is not among the categories of politics. That's why one could just shrug one's shoulders and state that Mikhail Gorbachev's time has run out. The new rulers are celebrating already: "Le roi est mort, vive le roi."

However, there is something that does not allow me to speak about the man in such a manner. Not because I agree with many of my compatriots who believe that Gorbachev gave unity to Germany – it was not in his power to halt the reunification process anyway. It is because Gorbachev endowed me and many others with a new vision of the world. In this sense, Gorbachev is a great reformer, however indecisive and problematic many of his political steps may have been. He made people start thinking in a different fashion. Let everyone ask oneself now how one's political views have changed since March 1985. My professional career provides an answer for me. The Cold War – with its arms race, disarmament and détente – was what shaped my outlook. I believed the Cold War would never end, it seemed so eternal. I thought my task was not to facilitate the end of the Cold War, but to make it more predictable, stable and tolerable. Mikhail Gorbachev, however, changed the old vision of the world in three dimensions.

First, he demonstrated the irreality of the seemingly reasonable strategy of competition and intimidation. Suddenly we all could see that there was nothing behind it. When the arms race kept spiralling up and up, when each superpower summit only deepened the split of the world, I sometimes thought what might happen if one of the sides refused to play according to the old rules of the game. It took the courageous man from Moscow to make my speculations a reality. Today the symbols of the old times in the political landscape look like gigantic and repulsive ruins.

Second, Mikhail Gorbachev worked another impressive miracle: the Cold War ended without a war a major bloodshed. Naturally, this is not solely Gorbachev's achievement. However, without his tactial skills and art of political survival the Soviet empire could not have collapsed in such a relatively peaceful manner.

In the early 1970s, I read much about how old empires collapsed: none of them, be it the Roman, the Ottoman or the Hapsburg Empire, to say nothing of the German Reich, had ever disappeared without wars or destruction. The one who would have ventured to suppose that the Soviet Union could disintegrate without a catastrophe, especially in the nuclear era, would have been ridiculed.

Third, Mikhail Gorbachev brought Russia back to Europe. The ties linking the culture of Russia with the culture of Europe seemed to have been severed forever: so alien and abnormal Moscow's rigidly bureaucratic imperialism seemed to the West. As for Gorbachev, he spoke the same language we spoke. He gave people in the Soviet Union their own voice and we saw that Soviets were Europeans too.

What has happened to these three major Gorbachevian achievements? Two of them already belong to history. But the third one – Russia's return to Europe – would not have been possible without the first two.

The way back to Europe will be long, hard and bumpy. Perhaps Russia will have to go through mutinies and coups. Perhaps people in Russia will once again be disappointed by Europe which will seem inaccessible to them because of its riches and worthy of contempt because of its greed. However, there is hope that the old barriers will not be erected again. Mikhail Gorbachev was the one who gave us this hope. And inspired by it, we can and must start creating a new world.

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We've beaten our own survival record!

Marina Shakina

From the point of view of economic reform, the outgoing year of 1991 may be described as a lost year. Most economists think so, and with good reason – sweeping economic reforms remain a long way off although all through the year we have been making every effort, it seems, to carry them out. Our "reformers" have even gone through the motions, withdrawing 50- and 100-ruble bank notes from circulation early this year and raising state prices on April 2. The initiators of the bank note withdrawal operation – Premier Pavlov and his cabinet – congratulated themselves on the success of what they called a crackdown on the mafia; actually, it only stampeded crowds into rescuing their savings, with several elderly ladies pensioners crushed almost to death in the scramble outside savings banks, and honed our fellow citizens' mother-wit to perfection (just one example: in the dead of night, people queued at an airport to buy return tickets to Taiwan so as to obtain a refund on the following day when the bank note withdrawal campaign was over). What's more, the operation put an end, once and for all, to whatever trust the public still had in the government. For the rest of the year, our citizens have been suspecting the government of all sorts of horrible intentions: to confiscate bank deposits, to withdraw one-ruble notes, to freeze wages, and what not. All through 1991 our people have been on the alert to outsmart the "scheming government" in what looked like a battle of wits...

The April price rise, once bad news, has been forgotten all about – it looks like an act of charity as compared with what is going on today. The naivete of it! At the beginning of the year there seemed to be nothing more horrible than a price jump, and we believed therefore that such a bitter medicine was certain to take effect. It became clear within a month, however, that the April price rise paved the way for hyperinflation, injured the government still more in the eyes of the public, but solved not a single problem.

Politicians forge ahead

In 1991, the economy became a hostage to political processes, the most important of them being the disintegration of the Union and the collapse – first slow, then rapidly accelerating – of the command administrative system. Political changes were so impetuous and crucial that our leaders came to give precedence to politics over economic matters.

An argument over what should have come first – economic reform or democratization – went on throughout the *perestroika* period. You can't do two jobs at a time, political scientists assured us. We had the alternative of following the Chilean pattern (economic progress under political dictatorship) or establishing a democracy of the poor on the ruins of the economy. A prosperous economy would certainly have eased up political tensions and might even help solve many problems connected with nationalism, separatism and isolationism. All through the year we have witnessed the leaders of the USSR (and then the leaders of the sovereign republics) trying to hold the crumbling economy together, and their attempts being reduced to nought by the political process with its irrefutable logic. Each time economic interests took a back seat to politics which goes to show that the habitual phrase "politics is a concentrated expression of economics" does not fully convey the complicated relationships between economics and politics.

Early this year it became clear that production slump and the rate of inflation would run into unprecedented figures, that the social welfare programmes financed from the central budget stood slim chances of being fulfilled, that long-established economic ties would be ruptured on an unprecedented scale. The outgoing year has seen the setting up of inter-republican customs barriers, the introduction of various forms of food rationing; individual republics are considering changing over to national currencies of their own.

At a certain juncture, concentrated efforts were made to preserve an "integral economic space," anti-crisis programmes were worked out by inertia, and Grigory Yavlinsky, back from Harvard, came up with one project after another. In a crumbling and practically uncontrollable "political space," however, economists' efforts were in vain, especially in the atmosphere of mutual suspicions and mistrust: "Other republics are plundering us, living at our expense, sponging on us..." Although political leaders reached agreements, life took its course, and the republics kept breaking away from the Union economically and politically.

1991 was rich in economic reforms. First was the anti-crisis programme of Premier **Valentin Pavl** which climaxed in the exchange of 50 and 100 ruble notes, drastic price hikes and the August putsc The economic recovery programme worked out by **Grigory Yavlinsky** and experts from Harvard adde to Yavlinsky's international fame but was not used here. Today the ailing economy is in the hands of t **Gennady Burbulis** team which has so far offered no programme, but declared its main principle liberalization, privatization and reduction of state subsidies. The Burbulis Cabinet will have to work the go – all the time that could be spent on thinking has been spent in 1991.

A long record of failures

In August, isolationist processes gained further in depth and speed. Following the suppression of the three-day putsch, of which Prime Minister Pavlov was an initiator (he had probably decided to make

amends to the public for the price rise trauma: the State Committee for the State of Emergency promised quite the opposite, a reduction in prices), the republics hastened to declare their independence and to expropriate all the property of the former Union and of the CPSU on their territories.

Although still in the air, the idea of economic accord became even less realistic because the Russian leadership came to the conclusion that without a political union, economic accord was of not much benefit to Russia. An agreement was signed, nevertheless, but Russia announced that it was prepared to pursue an independent economic policy. Each time Russia postponed launching genuine reforms at its partners' request. The latest delay was made in connection with the Brest agreements.

In the last month of the year it has become obvious that the country's economy is on the verge of an utter collapse: feudal barter trade without benefit of money has become common, production has slumped below the expected mark, prices have skyrocketed, transport services have got so expensive that most people cannot afford them any longer. Neither goods, nor services have been added to. In 1991, the former USSR has been proclaimed insolvent. Soviet goods were arrested in foreign ports in compensation for unpaid freight, Soviet railways' debts kept growing, fuel grew ever more expensive and "evaporated," equipment wore out and went out of date. Foreign banks have deferred the payment of interest on our debts. The West has granted us more aid.

Over the year, the government has never thought up ways to stimulate the producer. The raising of prices in a situation where practically all our enterprises are monopolists in their respective sphere has resulted in the curtailment rather than in the growth of production. Why bother if the same effect can be achieved by cutting production to a half, with the prices doubled? The government has never thought up ways to stimulate investment in production. Today enterprises prefer to spend their entire profit on consumption signing it off as production expense (i.e. wages). Incidentally, no profit means no taxes.

The government has never thought up ways to carry out demonopolization lest some enterprises should have undivided control over the market and suppress competition from others which may jeopardize their stability.

The government has never managed to stop the printing press which keeps discharging worthless paper money, while the

The socialist choice sank into oblivion. Until the second advent?

Supreme Soviet of the former USSR endorsed – with a dispatch worthy of a better cause – more and more loans from the Central Bank running into billions.

After all, why take such a dim view of things? We have stood the test for survival with flying colours, for the umpteenth time now.

Suicidal reformers

We have beaten our own survival record, but it would be reckless on our government's part to try and raise the bar still higher. There is every indication that further delay of economic reforms in the coming year – for fear of social explosions or out of consideration for our economic partners – will lead exactly to the much-dreaded social explosion and to repture of economic ties.

The start of the new economic policy has been timed precisely for the beginning of the year 1992. The "reform cabinet," as Gennady Burbulis, the first Vice-Premier of the Russian Federation, prefers to call the Russian government, seems to be ready for resolute action. If the Burbulis cabinet does take such action, it will become a "kamikaze cabinet" pretty soon. The reform is to begin with the liberalization of prices. Obviously, the preliminary measures like giving the financed-from-the-budget workers an almost 100-percent pay rise are a sedative rather than a cure. Price liberalization will put us all into a situation totally unfamiliar to us where each of us, accustomed to state paternalism, will have only himself to rely upon in the struggle for survival.

International experts suggest that the Russian government should screw up its courage and take the most difficult and the least popular measures first. Further on, social explosions may interfere with a reasonable policy. Be that as it may, the most radical moves are to be made in the early months of the coming year; besides everything else, the land reform has to be carried out before the spring sowing campaign begins.

The last crumbs

According to Gennady Burbulis, the government is prepared to reorganize collective and state farms in the near future, to stop subsidizing unprofitable enterprises, to reorganize them, and to carry out a land reform and to sell out unfinished projects.

International experts tell us, again and again: the recipes for recovery from the crisis are known, and the likely consequences of the anti-crisis measures to be taken are predictable. These measures consist in slashing budgetary expenditures – defence spending, above all – drastically, and shifting the burden, previously borne by the budget, to enterprises and to citizens themselves. It is necessary to cut down on state subsidies to unprofitable enterprises except those which, though unprofitable by world standards, are vital to society. Other anti-crisis measures include: liberalization of prices, making tax rates more sensible, stopping excessive emission of paper money, restricting loans to the state to reasonable limits, privatization of enterprises and putting an end to state monopoly on foreign trade. As to the consequences of these measures, the stabilization period may see an increase in unemployment, the lowering of the living standard, and social stratification. But the whole thing is that the state can protect weaker members of society only using the money earned by stronger ones – no other way has been invented so far.

The only feature peculiar to our country is a stable anti-market mentality which has taken shape over the past seventy-odd years. Quite a few people here miss no occasion to remark: "Under Stalin, we had everything... And under Brezhnev, things weren't half as bad as they are now..." Today we are savouring the last morsels of the command administrative system, scraping clean the bottom of our socialist choice which has reduced us to stark poverty over some seventy years or so. In the outgoing year we have never ventured to wound our own Communist sensibilities by changing over to the market economy – i.e. the economy which makes sense.

Requiem for the Union

Pax Brestiana: its present and future

Leonid Ionin

Pax Brestiana is the space organized in accordance with the Brest agreements finalized in Alma-Ata and with the spirit of these agreements. Pax Brestiana is the Commonwealth of Independent States which is now being created. Yet there is something more to it – the ideology and the way of life of this Commonwealth.

Territorially Pax Brestiana embraces the space of the former Soviet Union with a few, comparatively insignificant exceptions. How is this space organized, what holds together the states of the new Commonwealth? What are its prospects for the near and remote future?

Two steps forward, one step back

It should be noted that the working out and signing of the Brest papers looked somewhat illogical in the light of the tendencies prevalent during the last year and a half or two. Each of the Union republics longed for the fullest possible independence, trying the state for tensile strength. In each of them powerful national movements emerged, on whose tide new political élites came into being which subsequently overthrew the Union nomenklatura. The aim of this, which consisted in full independence and in the possibility to sail off on a free journey in the stormy sea of world politics and economics, was practically achieved. They had only to avoid participating in the Novo-Ogaryovo process and signing the Union Treaty, which was done by many republics. The refusal of the Ukraine alone was sufficient for the negotiations in Novo-Ogaryovo to be a failure. Other republics even didn't have to stipulate their position. The Union was falling apart all by itself.

All of a sudden, at the very culmination of this train of events, the agreement on founding a Commonwealth of Independent States was signed near Brest. At the very moment of gaining independence three republics suddenly made a step back, i.e., partially waived their much longed-for sovereignty and assumed responsibilities, which to some extent limited their sovereignty. Other republics, or new-born independent states, recognized the Commonwealth one after another and declared their willingness to join it. Characteristically, the first ones to do this were the states which had already abandoned the Union and proclaimed their independence. Those republics which had not formally broken away from the Union were not in a hurry to express their intention to join the Commonwealth.

There emerged a geopolitical structure which outwardly resembled the Soviet Union but was organized on entirely different principles. Whereas formerly the Union was held together by a unitary centre, now three centres and three geopolitical groupings within the Commonwealth have appeared. The first is Russia with its autonomies. The second is the Ukraine and Byelorussia; the third is Kazakhstan and Central Asian republics.

One is surprised at the lack of logic in this community. The Ukraine and Byelorussia are extremely little interested, if at all, in special relations with Central Asian republics, and vice versa. However, both groups are vitally interested in maintaining relations with Russia as a source of natural, power and intellectual resources in-



The USSR is dead. What will replace it?



Drawing by Igor Shein

dispensable for building independent economy allowing to set up business relations with Europe and the world.

Three scenarios for the Commonwealth

Thus Russia plays the part of the Commonwealth's "backbone," connecting its heterogeneous and organically mutually unrelated parts. On the other hand, Russia needs both these groups of republics politically: on the one hand, in order to be "closer" to Europe and to be directly joined to it, and on the other hand, in order to avoid its own disintegration in case the Central Asian republics leave it, taking with them those of Russian autonomies which are akin to them ethnically and by religion. An understanding of these interests made the republics which have seceded or are seceding from the Union, including Russia, make one step back, towards the recreation of its pale likeness.

It is possible that somebody contemplates the Commonwealth as something durable and ever-lasting, but most probably it is a temporary entity. The Ukraine, inspired by nationalist movements and, according to Kravchuk's reasonable remark, "possessing everything" required for truly independent existence, needs Russia only for a rather short transitional period. Relations with the Central Asian states promise to be more durable. Both the Ukraine and other states will indulge in increasingly independent political practices, ridding themselves of limitations ensuing from the conditions of the Commonwealth, so that eventually Russia will have to consider the advantages provided by membership in the Commonwealth inadequate to the losses and that will be the real end of the Empire.

Pax Brestiana is not an organic, viable political and economic entity, but a transitional phenomenon brought to life by certain fear of independence and by desire to avoid greater problems. The most important question now is that of what will become of this Pax Brestiana?

Strictly speaking, there are three scenarios possible. The first: Russia, by means of political and economical manoeuvres, strengthens its position in the Commonwealth and turns it into a federal state – sort of updated Soviet Union without Soviet ideology, of course. This is the unaccomplished dream of the first and last President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. The second scenario has been expounded above: the increasing unwillingness of the republics to reckon with the interests of their partners in the Commonwealth, their mutual isolation, growing mutual claims eventually conducive to a sequence of dangerous military clashes and disintegration of not only Russia, but of some of the constituent "independent states" as well. And the third perspective: transformation of the Commonwealth, its reconstruction on a completely new basis in which its members will be not so much independent national as federal states with a wide spectrum of regional and ethnic autonomies.

For many reasons, which are hardly worth enumerating here, the first scenario does not seem realizable now. The third one is not altogether ruled out, although its implementation would require tremendous changes in the ideology of the Commonwealth as well as in the mentality of its constituent peoples. We will dwell on it a bit later. However, considering the current tendencies, the second perspective seems the most plausible one.



"Luggage – railway – Russia"

It is commonplace to say that the falling apart of the so-called Soviet Empire was caused primarily by the intense growth of national democratic movements. No place on the political scene was left for the Centre which, so to speak, personified the imperial principle, because democrats both in Russia and in republics demanded that the right to national self-determination should be put into practice. The struggle against the Empire, or the Centre, was that against Soviet totalitarianism and for that reason was at first carried on as a democratic action.

However, the results it produced were in many respects disappointing, because almost all republics which hurriedly seceded from the Union began to demonstrate, though in varying degrees, that liberation from Moscow's heavy hand does not automatically entail becoming a democracy. It can be explained by many reasons – economic problems requiring, at least at the initial stages, an "iron hand" and, consequently,

rejection of certain democratic norms; the absence of a ready infrastructure of democracy; peculiarities of the specific Soviet mentality forstered for decades.

But the most important reason lay in that in many republics totalitarian ideology was replaced by that of national fundamentalism. Not everywhere this tendency was manifested with equal clearness, yet practically all of them are infected with fundamentalism, although in varying degree. And practically everywhere national fundamentalism turned out to be the senior trump in political game.

It is precisely this national fundamentalism, and not democratic norms and principles, that in the absolute majority of cases appear to be the ideological basis of national states emerging on the territory of the former USSR.

According to an investigation carried out abroad, out of approximately 220 states that exist on earth, only about 20 (which make 9 percent of the total) are purely national, i.e., ethnically homogeneous. Practically none of our republics falls into this category. Almost all of the newly emerging national states on the territory of the USSR are multinational. But controversial as it is, the right to sovereignty in those national states is based on sovereignty of the autochtonous or, in current parlance, "title" national group.

The consequences of proclaiming such national states with polyethnic composition of population are not long in coming. Their very appearance is accompanied by inner split which leads either to secession of some regions or suppression of ethnic dissidence by most undemocratic methods. The first case may be illustrated by Moldova with its secessionist Gagauzia and Pridnestroviye, the second by Georgia abolishing the Ossetian autonomy and Azerbaijan doing the same in regard to Nagorny Karabakh.

Polyethnic states, proclaiming themselves national, thus transfer their citizens of "non-title" nationalities to the category of the "second rate" ones and their right to autonomous existence is replaced by the "state-forming" national group's arbitrary judgement – as granting autonomies to ethnic minorities rests entirely with this group. Since ethnic minorities do exist, they come to be faced with a very simple alternative – either assimilation, or emigration, according to the aphorism formulated by the Popular Front of Moldova: "Luggage – railway – Russia."

This is, of course, only a broad outline. The choice is rarely formulated so outspokenly. However, the practical reality in the newborn national states evolves precisely in this direction. They resort to a double play: regard as sacred the right of their own, "title" nation to self-determination and deny this right to other national and ethnic groups living on their territory.

Boris Yeltsin

Leonid Kravchuk

Nursultan Nazarbayev

Long live the Commonwealth?

In the last days of 1991 a new entity – the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has taken the place of the former Soviet Union.

That the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan joined the Minsk Agreements hasn't created a sensation. What is really surprising is that three other republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova – made up their mind so quickly. At that, it's precisely membership in the Commonwealth that allows these republics to hope for a solution of many problems inherited from the Soviet epoch the most important of which are the economic and national ones. It's precisely the fear of finding themselves cut off from Russia, the Ukraine and other kindred republics, of losing their national identity and, finding themselves, one fine day, in a united Romanian state forced the Russian-speaking

The 19th century's prescriptions

The situation is also aggravated by the circumstance that political and administrative boundaries on the "imperial debris" do not coinside with the ethnic ones. They have been drawn in a rather arbitrary way, and at present there are no republics (including autonomous formations) on the territory of the USSR which have no territorial claims, overt or temporarily unavowed, to their neighbours. As historical experience demonstrates, these claims, as well as the ethnic minorities' aspirations for gaining autonomy in polyethnic states, can be removed or suppressed by force only for a time. They never disappear completely, and eventually give rise to wars, sometimes even to great wars.

Local wars and conflicts on ethnic grounds are already there: Karabakh, Pridnestroviye. The Commonwealth of Independent States has no means to settle them, because the ideology it is based on is that of full sovereignty of its national member states. In fact, this ideology as such dictates the necessity to suppress "rebellious" minorities and rules out a possibility of their protection from the outside which is regarded as interference in internal affairs of a sovereign state. The further do the republics advance on the path of gaining independence and consolidating the statehood they think they "deserve," the greater becomes the danger of new conflicts and the more meagre are the means the Commonwealth has to settle them.

That means a different, democratic solution is to be sought. Yet so far everything is going on according to the old recipes – formation of centralized national states is under way. Even the vast Ukraine with its diversity of regions, ethnic and national groups was constituted as a "unitary and indivisible" state, thus undermining its own future.

New bureaucracies come to light. New God-forsaken regions will be formed along the new borders where, to quote an historian, people who formerly lived "face to face" will live "back to back." Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Asia are marching "backwards," to the 19th century, which was essentially the

residents of Pridnestroviye to enter into confrontation with the Kishinev leadership. The same fear forced the population of Karabakh to proclaim independence and ask for admission to the Commonwealth as a full-fledged member. The common economic space and the openness of internal borders confirmed by the Minsk agreements give a chance to considerably ease the tension and settle these conflicts by political methods, if not to solve these problems immediately.

So far everything looks rather successful on the surface – out of 15 former republics 11 are united in the Commonwealth. Georgia will consider her choice in the nearest future. If we take into account that the idea of creating a Union of Sovereign States was attractive only to seven of them, there seem to be reasons to rejoice. Anyhow, statements made by leaders of the states show that the situation is differently assessed in different republics, which concerns both single Commonwealth citizenship and foreign policy. The Ukraine constantly emphasizes its special position in the Commonwealth (as previously in the Union). All this means that it is yet too early to see the future of this Commonwealth, though a voluntary alliance, through rose-coloured spectacles. It's not clear what will come of it in practice. Circumstances may once more prove stronger than the will of political leaders.

Already now voices are heard saying that the Commonwealth will not be durable – either it will fall apart in the near future or turn into something solid and integrated, like the former Union.

The USSR belongs to the past, like its first and last president, Mikhail Gorbachev, does. New leaders who have received their mandate from the people are at the wheel. This year became the year of **Yeltsin, Kravchuk** and **Nazarbayev,** and now the West will have to conduct dialogue with eleven leaders. Western politicians have already understood that it was easier and more convenient to deal with the unitary, unshakable Soviet Union personified in the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. And, as it seems, they already bemoan the USSR.

age of flowering national states, which led to terrible upheavals. Western Europe has taken it into account.

A scenario of survival according to Yeltsin

What democratic solution is possible? Confrontations between states and controversies within polyethnic states – "mini-empires" – can be removed by means of transforming their centralized bureaucratic structures into federal structures with a wide spectrum of national and regional autonomies, including "transborder" ones, enjoying equal rights.

In short, only a voluntary partial rejection of certain sovereign rights by the states which formerly made the USSR can ensure now a successful and peaceful development on the one sixth of the earth. This partial rejection of sovereignty must take place both "upwards" and "downwards." Upwards in the sense of forming supranational organs of a future Eurasian Commonwealth, including those that are indispensable for creating common economic space, as well as common legal space, without which no guarantees of human and ethnic rights on the entire territory of the Commonwealth are possible.

Present in all talks about the future of the Commonwealth is the idea of its members delegating part of their sovereignty "upwards." But nothing is said to the effect that **a democratic community is possible only on the condition that the member states delegate some of their sovereign rights "downwards" – to the level of regional and national autonomies.**

In Europe, the talk about a Europe made up not of states but of regions has started long ago. In Russia, Boris Yeltsin has promised to autonomies as much sovereignty as they are able to take. And they do take it, desirous of too much, yet they will "swallow" not more than they can.

This is a very painful process, accompanied by the necessity to abandon imperial prejudices, the more so since some are newly acquired. This is why there is so much talk about the death of Russia. However, it is only a matter of death of former totalitarian regime. Not only autonomies, but territorial regions long for more independence too. This is a normal process of decentralization.

Unlike Europe, where regionalization is taking place above state boundaries, we have no such boundaries (for the time being!), instead there are interrepublican economic and cultural complexes which may become the basis for "transborder" regions. In the situation of a unitary legal and economic space the circumstance that various parts of a region belong to various states poses no problems, because by delegating its rights "down," the state entrusts a region and its organs of power with the responsibility to solve all regional problems, regional norms and regulations having priority over the state ones.

The Commonwealth must become something more than a mere union of states. If it doesn't, it will have no future, and will be even dangerous. Parallel to it, on a lower level, a union of regions and autonomies must be formed.

There are already signs of positive developments. A natural and organic process of regional formation is taking place – in Pridnestroviye, the Irkutsk Region, Sakhalin and the Kurils. From the point of view of regional mentality, the proposal to create a transborder region "South Kurils–Northern Hokkaido" stands to reason. It will be the first attempt to lay a bridge between countries. Larger entities – the Turkestan Commonwealth, the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus and the Baltic Union are being formed as a manifestation of regional creative activity.

The more such regions are formed and the greater is the number of such entities, the more the political picture of the former Soviet Union begins to correspond to the real diversity of its ethnic and cultural life.

The time of "unitary and indivisible" entities is passing away. History shows that they are quite divisible. It is possible that we will eventually come to a federal-regional structure of the Commonwealth. The question is whether it will be possible to achieve without new wars, without bloodshed and a new edition of the great migration of peoples which has already begun. Its consequences are equal to those of a war.

The euphoria of national sovereignties is a delusive mirage. After the World War I, when new independent national states arose on the ruins of collapsing empires, it also seemed that the long-craved peace and concord would last for ever.

■

President stormed

Battles in Tbilisi. The opposition, supported by the National Guards, is storming the House of Government. They demand that President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia resign and leave the country.

For already a long time political scientists have been drawing our attention to this Transcaucasian republic and forecast that local democrats, who came to power on the wave of the national-liberation movement, will inevitably degenerate politically. Only half a year ago a former defender of human rights and dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected President by the overwhelming majority (85 percent of the electorate) and amidst general acclaim. It is true that both then and later there were rumours that the results of the elections were forged. However, "the train has left," the fact of falsification has never been proved and today Zviad Gamsakhurdia is the legally and democratically elected leader of the Georgian state, while the opposition members headed by former Prime Minister Tenghiz Sigua and National Guards Commander Tenghiz Kitovani are rioteers.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia

Tenghiz Sigua

Tenghiz Kitovani

As an independent state, Georgia has not been recognized by the world community because, inter alia, the human rights situation in the country under the former human rights defender Gamsakhurdia proved to be far below the international standards. Even in the former Soviet Union Gamsakhurdia did not enjoy support of his democratic fellow-fighters whereas the world community now regards Georgia as an authoritarian regime. Nor can the President of Georgia be called a skilful politician, which is proved by the abolishing of the South Ossetian autonomy. Both the world and Soviet Union experience has shown that such measures, far from solving, aggravate and prolong the existence of these problems. The military confrontation in South Ossetia is gaining in intensity, which has made Russia refuse to sign a bilateral agreement with Georgia.

Rather suspicious is also the fact that a number of Gamsakhurdia's political opponents – Chanturia, Khaindrava, Ioseliani, Kulumbekov – were thrown to jail. "They are criminal offenders," explains the president, "and not political prisoners." However, in the pre-*perestroika* years defenders of human rights also served their terms as criminals.

Nevertheless the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia would put Georgia in a still more complicated situation. Whatever the world's attitude towards the present Georgian President, it is still less inclined to have to do with usurpers, regardless of their nice intentions and, possibly, future nice deeds. Besides, Gamsakhurdia's dethroning might make him a national hero for many years to come. Even if Gamsakhurdia is compelled to agree to a compromise, this forced concord will hardly look decent, too. In a civilized society conflicts between the government and the opposition are settled in parliament, at elections or at worst in the court, in case the President is accused of breach of law.

As long as there is no stable democratic regime in Georgia, all attempts to appeal to public opinion and leaders of the world community will be futile. Georgia is the only among the republics of the former Union which has not joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (not to count the Baltics, which is a special case.) There are absolutely no grounds for interference in its internal affairs on the part of the Commonwealth, at least as long as the conflict has not affected the Soviet Army. Let's hope that no provocative actions will force it to get involved. Most probably, both the world and the Commonwealth will take a neutral position of wait-and-see. There is no central government today, so there is no one for Gamsakhurdia to pin his hopes on or to blame.

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A sanctuary for the monster

Tanks are not needed on the domestic market. The transition to a market economy is unthinkable without the reconversion of the defence industry. The untying of this knot would put the economy right

Prof. *Yuri Varshavsky,*
D.Sc. (Medicine)

How to demilitarize the MIC

The idea of using the military-industrial potential for the revival of the medical equipment industry was born in Chelyabinsk-70, a defence research complex. In civilized nations the production of medical equipment is next in importance to arms manufacture by its high technology, price formation, volume of series and prestige. The leading designers of this equipment are employed in the medical companies of such giants of the military-industrial complex (MIC) as Siemens, General Electric, Thomson, Philips and Toshiba. Some development work in the medical field has been done within each of the defence-related branches of the Soviet Union. It is characteristic, however, that in no branch has the problem been tackled in a comprehensive way. Besides, owing to the lack of ties between ministries and of a coordinating centre, research work was conducted separately and there was the overlapping of it.

For instance, an experimental X-ray computer tomograph has been developed in Chelyabinsk-70. The same work, but using the nuclear magnetic resonance effect, has been carried out in the ministry of electrical engineering. The ministry of the radio industry is designing a tomograph echoscope. The ministry of electrical engineering has developed a nuclear magnetic resonance tomograph. The radiation sources, reading devices and many things are entirely different in them. However, the digital processing system, which amounts to no less than half the cost of each instrument, is essentially the same. The designers of the three instruments do not know anything about each other. This situation is far from common sense and does not measure up to the demands of competition.

The existing system of production of medical equipment is so rotten that it is simpler to establish a new one than reanimate the old. Where are the main obstacles? The ministries of medical equipment and the microbiological industry are unable to compete with such a giant as the MIC. During the Brezhnev period "a historic decision" by the party's central committee or a government's decision, imposed on the MIC, incidentally, was needed for the development of important medical equipment. The research institutes in the defence industry waved modest civil orders away because they had a share in the "fat" military budget. The situation has changed now and the defence needs are obviously diminishing.

Prof. Vladimir Nechai, director of the research institute of technical physics, had to make a final decision. We quickly found an ally in his person. It was felt, however, that he was not given permission from higher authorities. It was a time when the MIC leadership did not help its enterprises and institutes

Conclusion. For the beginning see issue No.51/91

any longer but continued to demand strictly that they coordinate all their actions. In these circumstances, without referring to Chelyabinsk-70, we applied to the MIC boss, deputy premier Igor Belousov. One brief instruction after another was written on our application, and soon it began to resemble a soiled banknote. But we found very convincing arguments.

Defence industry used for medical purposes

The medical division of the Defective Children's Aid Fund operates mainly in the Chelyabinsk region, where the first tragedy of the Chernobyl type took place 30 years ago. No one disputes today that the real activity of a radio nuclide discharge there was 12 times more powerful than it was announced earlier. Leaving professional details aside, I can describe my impressions of the examination of over 5,000 children in that region. Most of the children are "worse" than their parents: every second or third child begins to walk only at two and speak at four years of age; their parents have each five to six teeth left in the mouth by 35 years of age. One can hardly find a lake, pond or river where people can swim. There is a smoking chimney almost for every child. It is clear without explanation that this ecological disaster has been created mainly by defence enterprises. We could pass on this information – it is rather correct – to the mass media, any radical periodical and, after a "scandal" in the press, come to the bodies concerned with the worst victims of the tragedy and demand: "Give us money for what you have done."



Drawing by V. Mokievsky

The state of roads and housing, the quality of the medical service, the possibilities of recreation and, lastly, "successes" in the campaign against privileges have shaken the already fragile civil spirit of our taxpayers. The Children's Aid Fund has been allowed to engage in alternative economic activity, for instance, in organizing geological prospecting and film festivals and concerts abroad. In such cases the taxes will be reduced in favour of sickly children. I think several large cooperatives will agree to operate under our signboard, if only invite them, and each of them will donate up to a million rubles to the fund, also for the maintenance of a staff of four to five employees. The point is that a million rubles will inevitably be deducted by tax inspectors from their profit, whereas the same million donated as charity will enhance the respect of a cooperative.

We firmly believe that a modern medical equipment industry can be built with the help of capacities released in the process of conversion of the defence industry, and propose starting from the production of most essential instruments. The superprofit must go to the unfortunate children.

At last, a reply came from the MIC's top executives. Our scheme had been approved. In this way the KMK consortium (conversion-medicine-commerce) was founded. Among its cofounders are the research institute of technical physics in Chelyabinsk-70, the town council of Verkhny Ufalei in the Chelyabinsk region, and the Medas research and production association of the Defective Children's Aid Fund. It can be said without exaggeration that Alexander Sandal, a people's deputy of the Russian Federation, is the "godfather" of the consortium.

The initial difficulties of the consortium were contained, incidentally, in the reply of the MIC's top executives. Having approved our initiative, they proposed that we join the public health ministry's plan for the development of new medical equipment. A month later we received a letter from the ministry of public health. It warned dryly that any instrument or apparatus developed by us will not be introduced without clinical testing and their subsequent approval by the ministry.

Give them a lever

I do not remember a case when two intelligent persons could not reach agreement. At the same time our experience shows that as soon as their agreement (for the welfare of others) has to be put into effect by government bodies a sad outcome is predetermined. Should the water poured from a tap be pure? It is a rhetoric question. It must be pure, of course. It is difficult to expect another reply, the more so from a top executive of the Russian Federation's ministry of housing and utilities, though in a Union ministry we were politely shown the door. Of course, in the ministry of housing and utilities the question was not formulated so primitively. It was asked: "Do you need plants for monitoring and the purification of drinking water to the US standard, which is two orders higher than ours?" It turned out that such plants are needed very much. During several meetings both sides demonstrated not only unanimity in understanding the importance of the problem, but also profound knowledge of its engineering solution. It is not a trifling matter because water has to be purified of radio nuclides, salts of heavy metals and phenol. However, the talks brought no result, and it could not be otherwise because the financial position of the organization in charge of water supply does not depend on the quality of drinking water.

What should the defence research institutes and plants do? Their technologies are higher than the possibilities of small cooperatives and enterprises. They can be mastered only by large factories, integrated works and even whole branches. Besides, without going deep into an analysis of reasons, I shall note that so far the market situation is favourable mainly for resale. It is no secret, however, that

most alternative businesses now prosper thanks to the resale of one and the same product. I would call it "a collective contribution to inflation."

This deformity can be corrected only if the state is able to stimulate producers. This particularly refers to defence plants. Their position will not be saved even if they are financed as before. The progressing depreciation of the ruble strengthens the market role of the owner of goods, not money. In their present condition the MIC enterprises are unable to engage in barter. Agriculture does not need nuclear bombs, aircraft carriers or submarines. The conversion of giant defence-related enterprises to the production of goods for civil needs requires considerable effort and expenditure. There is no money, however. In this case it is necessary to define priority spheres in regearing military production with lower taxation during the conversion period. If this is not done the MIC enterprises will be unable to increase commodity output.

However, even this is not enough to commercialize the MIC's enterprises. They remind me of a man selling apples on the market at five rubles a kilo while all others sell them at three rubles a kilo. Asked why such a price, he replies that he has many debts. The mechanism of setting prices for the products of defence enterprises is connected with colossal overhead charges, including the payment of unique but rarely used equipment, barbed wire and many other things, up to the "closed towns" kept by them. In such circumstances there can be no talk of a market competitiveness of goods manufactured by defence enterprises for civil purposes.

Skilled manpower is a decisive factor

The reputation of enterprises working for the high interests of the state seems to justify the order established in each of them. The most typical instance of arbitrary rule is the banning of alternative businesses in defence-industry enterprises. This "inflexible" stand leads to the dissipation of the most dynamic potential. The integral and carefully selected body of unique collectives is beginning to disintegrate because the best workers find jobs in various cooperatives or privately-run small businesses, sometimes situated in other towns.

The situation could be different. The concentration of various enterprises with a concrete project in each of them, supporting the head association, is a tested means in the civilized world. Such a dynamic coexistence under one signboard would help quickly introduce technololgies (a weak point of our enterprises) and keep up the scientific and technical standards.

The outflow of the best workers can be stopped only by a drastic reduction of arms purchases. The advocates of left policy have repeatedly called for such a moratorium, hoping for an intensive regearing of the military-industrial complex to the production of goods for civil needs. But early in August of this year the MIC bosses increased the salaries of engineers and technicians twofold and the wages of workers threefold. This created confusion in the minds of the personnel who believed that they were still needed in their former capacity. Only a few understood that such a pay rise was possible only thanks to the continuing emission of money and that the outcome of this policy may be devastating.

It should be remembered that the fate of conversion is in the firm hands of managers of defence-industry enterprises. Most of them are over 50 years of age. Realizing that they will be unable to retain their posts, they nevertheless try to avoid retiring on pension. If managers are hard pressed, however, they will be able to engage in privatization, retaining first of all their leading role in the appropriation of public wealth. The schemes of mushrooming associations and corporations are drawn up for these main "heroes." There is not yet another alternative in department offices to these steps towards meeting present-day realities. Public property is understood as a purely nominal notion. All people, especially some of them, are "equal" in the process of privatization.

People tend to exaggerate the significance of their cause. Nevertheless, we believe that the proposal to revive the medical equipment industry with the help of reconversion deserves attention from every point of view. The shoots of reconversion should be carefully tended. Without a fundamental change in its tactic we are unlikely to achieve successes in the near future. ■

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When the vanquished rejoice. American aid came after the defeat

Photo from Paris-Match (France)

The barrier of hatred

1991

Year of Judgement

Middle East: Gulf war early in the year, peace talks at its close

The year of judgement in the Middle East began with a war and ended in peace talks. The war broke out in the Persian Gulf in January, 1991 and peace talks between Arabs and Israelis got under way in December. Between the two events lies a year of trials, fear and hopes...

The situation in the East is very delicate. In August 1990 the Arab Moslem Iraq absorbed the no less Arab Moslem Kuwait. It seemed that the Moslem world should have implemented the slogan "Moslems of all countries, unite" in the name of saving the downtrodden sister country. However, the Arab and the entire Moslem world was split, with Egypt, Syria and the Persian Gulf states on one side, and Iraq, Jordan and the Palestinians on the other. The entire world, to say nothing about the expanse under the Koran, was also divided over the issue.

The forces of the new world order (the beneficial effect of détente was revealed in this case) sided with the emir of Kuwait, whose name was hardly known before the Iraqi expansion, because they realized that at the threshold of the 21st century the impudent aggressor must not be allowed to profit from his crime. In the opinion of Saddam Hussein and other dictators, the United Nations is a useless organization, a debating society. But it is perhaps for the first time in many years that the UN showed its mettle and became a real force in world politics. Unlike in the past, Moscow did not put a spoke in the UN wheel and did not use its veto right in the Security Council. Moreover, for the first time after the second world war the Soviet Union and the United States cooperated with each other, acted in the world arena not as enemies, but as partners. Local patriots contend that the USSR did not lose anything from this step. On the contrary, it behaved as a great power which bears responsibility for the destinies of peace.

The allied nations defended not so much the Gulf emirs as the new world order. The people of good will were glad to learn that the cowardly Saddam troops had been routed. They rejoiced as if their own country was liberated. Perhaps the world really becomes a common home for mankind.

The "Baghdad thief" was also unable to play the usual Palestinian card. The



Palestinians came to the peace conference with olive branches. Will they help establish peace in the Middle East?

Photo from Time magazine (USA)

Baghdad regime claimed that it was fighting for the Palestinians while the latter repeated like children that they were with Saddam in one trench. Hussein did not care about the Palestinians. It was important for him to lay his hands on the fabulous oil riches of the "rotten regimes."

The dictator was sure that Americanophobia spiced with Judophobia will work again and the entire Arab and Moslem world rise against the "Zionist-imperialist aggression." But this ruse did not work. Phobia is inherent in those who do not accept freedom and democracy, that is, in people with slavish totalitarian mentality. The vindictive, wicked and self-conceited dictator, lulled by the flattery of his close subordinates and devoid of the sense of reality, had one more sinister design. He thought that once a war begins victims will inevitably appear. The regime may not count its victims while in decadent bourgeois America the "peace forces" will kick up a row and finally depose President Bush because of the loss of human lives. This ruse did not work either. The world has probably grown wiser during the past years.

Is the armed invasion of the territory of another state lawful? Patriotism of a different kind is widely spread in the world: it is better to stay in the "domestic" concentration camp rather than to be liberated by foreigners. The war in the Persian Gulf signified a new approach to this problem. Any action against totalitarian despotic regimes can and must be justified. It is necessary to support preventive military action against the madmen who resort to nuclear blackmail. The destruction of the nuclear arsenals of latter-day fuehrers goes beyond the limits of interference in the affairs of other countries and becomes the beneficial cause of saving humanity from the threat of a nuclear disaster. Human rights and freedoms are above state frontiers.

Anwar Sadat once said that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a 90 percent psychological one. It is necessary to ovestep the barrier of hatred. That is not easy to do. By undertaking an unprecedented pilgrimage to Jerusalem in November 1977, to the damned enemies, the Egyptian President overstepped this psychological barrier. He went down in history for this step and paid his life for it. Other leaders needed 14 long years to cross this barrier of hatred. Moscow has restored its diplomatic relations with Israel, and the United Nations has annulled the disgraceful resolution which equated Zionism with racism.

I can judge from my own observations that certain positive changes are taking place in the Palestine Liberation Organization. It is time for Tel Aviv to revise its stand. Without mutual concessions it will apparently be impossible to make progress in the Middle East settlement. Amman and Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem are probably beginning to understand this truth.

The Arabs and Israelis have at last started negotiations in Madrid and Washington. They have not agreed on anything. It is true, and nevertheless it is good, because they began negotiations for the first time. I believe they have realized that Arabs and Jews are the same human beings. If no one interferes in their talks, they will be able to reach agreement in a year or two. After all, *salam* and *shalom* have the same root.

Yakov Borovoi

An extremely long and eventful year

Year of Judgemnt

Central Europe: a step closer to the European home. But the home is on fire

Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaya

It seems that 1991 lasted very long. The kaleidoscopic change of events in the disintegrating empire has speeded up the trends of development in Central Europe and on the whole continent. Each of these events agitated the minds of people only for a short time. In a few weeks, days or even hours other events overshadowed the previous ones, making them unimportant.

The year 1991 seems to have been woven of uncertainties and incomplete events. In a way it was a year that incorporated as much as three political years, each with its own face. The first year began with the January clashes in Vilnius and lasted till the presidential election in Russia in June. There was a whiff of the cold war, and it seemed for a time that the rusty "iron curtain" began to grind from the western to the eastern frontiers of the former socialist camp.

The second year lasted from the emergence of an unnatural situation of "two bears (Gorbachev and Yeltsin) in one lair," obviously fraught with an inevitable conflict, to the ill-contrived coup. Only two-month-long, it was a year of timid hopes and of short and uncertain relief especially for those countries in which we still had our troops stationed. The third year began on August 21, in front of the Russian parliament's building, and like 1989, it ended in an event to be recorded in history – the complete breakup of the empire.

Watching the funeral of the empire, long feared and secretly hated by them, our western neighbours and the world as a whole do not yet know exactly whether they should rejoice at the quick demise of the Union and the resignation of Gorbachev. I think no one doubts that the political race is interrupted only for the Christmas time.

Even highly experienced diplomats and statesmen could not properly follow the developments in the Soviet Union. Accustomed to a measured and rational analysis, they found it difficult to adapt themselves to the clumsy improvisations and unexpected turns of newly-baked bonapartes and talleyrands. It will be recalled that the political leaders of neighbouring countries emerged in the world scene only recently. The swinging of the political pendulum to the right or the left, accompanied by the howling in chorus of cassandras of every calibre, can instill them with alarm and even fear. Who can believe, for instance, the statements of a top Russian official who talks about the strength of the new commonwealth in December, though last spring he warned that a sudden breakup of the Soviet Union would mean a high degree of instability, while the emergence of inadequately responsible leaders in Central Europe, unconscious of the realities of the region, would merely aggravate national conflicts and lead to the Balkanization of vast territories. A natural reaction to such a prospect would be to move farther from it and seek assistance elsewhere.

The vacuum of strength

This is what happened in fact. The Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were dissolved quietly and almost simultaneously nearly a year ago, though it seems they ceased to exist very long ago. Soviet troops have left Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, while their withdrawal from Poland and Germany is only a mater of time and money, if unforeseen circumstances do not complicate it. After the confrontation between blocks ended Central and South-Eastern Europe did not have a reliable collective system which could guarantee the security of its countries and give the desired weight to them on the

continent. The ensuing vacuum of strength causes anxiety in post-communist states, especially because of long-standing and now reviving ethnic and territorial conflicts between them, not to mention drastic changes in the East.

However, these states do not want to replace the Warsaw Treaty by a new regional alliance, let alone assume the role of a neutral belt separating the republics of the former USSR from NATO and the European Community. After bargaining for a long time over a standard article in bilateral treaties of friendship which virtually implied the commitment to become such a belt, the Soviet Foreign Ministry abandoned the hopeless venture and reconciled itself to the obstinacy of Central European countries which want, each by itself, to join West-European economic and political alliances.

This evidently explains the slack in the activity of such amorphous unions as Pentagonale (Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia) and the Central European triangle (Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary). For obvious reasons nothing is heard of Pentagonale which allegedly intended to turn into Hexagonale by including Poland into it. It was Yugoslavia's turn to chair the union in 1991 and the beautiful city of Dubrovnik was chosen as the venue for the summit. However, the plan went awry.

A strait jacket for prospective members

Apart from the worsening of the situation in the Soviet Union, the presidents of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary were impelled to meet in Vysehrad by the veiled pressure of the West, which insisted on regional cooperation and, in particular, on the formation of a monetary union as a condition for aid. The three countries resisted the West's pressure in every possible way because they saw behind its advice the desire to keep them in "the old geopolitical strait jacket." Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary had no intention to form an isolated group because their chief aim was to join by combined efforts the political and

No peace, no hope

Among the many hopes of ordinary Europeans buried in the course of events in 1991 were the hopes of this old Croatian woman from Dubrovnik. Having survived the horrors of the second world war in her youth, she believed that her children and grandchildren would live in a peaceful, happy and prosperous country. But there is no peace in Yugoslavia today. There is no happiness either. The prospects of prosperity are obscured by the war. Yugoslavia as a federal republic does not exist any longer. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina are now sovereign states. All of them are armed. Only a year ago class interests were considered higher than the interests of man, and today priority is given to national interests. Towns and villages are burning and people dying. There is no end to the first European war over frontiers between countries which only recently considered themselves socialist and contended that socialism and wars, socialism and border disputes were incompatible. It is the end of one more myth.

Photo from L'Express (France)

economic systems of West European states. During the past year the "triangle" has been practically inactive, though consultations have been held at a working level, for instance, between the defence ministries of the three countries. However, in August Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa and Jozsef Antall jointly inquired Hans van den Broek whether their countries could take part in coordinating foreign policy together with the 12 other members of the European Community.

Under the present difficult economic situation even Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, most advanced in the implementation of reforms, could not count on joining the European Community easily. The summer talks on granting them the status of associated members did not proceed smoothly, because Hungary and Poland were undesirable rivals of France on the agricultural market. In view of strong resistance on the part of France it is not known how the talks would end were it not for the abortive August coup in Moscow. This event helped to move the talks off the ground. In a statement published after the coup attempt in Moscow NATO made it known that it regards the security of Central Europe in indissoluble connection with the security of the Atlantic alliance. Late in November the long-awaited agreement on associated membership was initialled.

No matter what deadline is set by the EC for the joining of Central European states as equal members – the period ranges from ten to "dozens of years," as François Mitterrand noted – the Community has already assumed real, though limited obligations. Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Hungary would like to impart a formal juridical character to these obligations. In their opinion, the preamble of the agreement should contain a point on the admission of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Hungary till the end of the century not only as their own desire, but also as the common intention of these countries and of the European Community. The November decisions have created a precedent. The statements that Romania and Bulgaria are successfully advancing towards a market economy will sooner or later give these countries a chance to become associated members. The possibility of joining the EC is also discussed now in the Baltic republics and even in Albania (a small country that can be incorporated more easily).

Fears in Moscow

With the evident desire of our former partners to join the European Community, one can only wonder why Soviet Russian politicians find it difficult to understand this fact. Ivan Silayev and Stanislav Shatalin think for some reason that Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria would be prepared to join the economic community which has not eventually formed. Boris Yeltsin's remark about the possible joining of Bulgaria and Romania to the yet unborn commonwealth can apparently be regarded as a joke. To achieve really advantageous economic cooperation, the Moscow dreamers will have to swallow political realities, even if they are unpalatable like cod-liver oil. After the contradictory outcome of parliamentary elections in Bulgaria and Poland, which revealed the tiredness and disappointment of a considerable section of the population and its readiness to listen to Left parties and even to go on strike, these symptoms were interpreted in various ways. The subject of former Polish Communists would have been exhausted immediately had the articles about "the party's gold" appeared before the voting. However, deeper causes should be sought here.

In the first, post-revolutionary year, a roughly 7 percent decline in the gross domestic product was survived more or less easily by East Europeans who felt excited by freedom of speech and travel. A 10 percent decline in the second year, and almost a 25 percent fall in industrial output during two years, gave rise to dissatisfaction and doubts. For isntance, Czechs, who lived well by our standards, could not understand why troubles befell them instead of European boons.

We Europeans?

Faced with numerous obstacles on the thorny path they had first imagined as a smooth road, East Europeans are beginning to think what modern Europe, the blessed land for them, represents indeed. People in our country are also beginning to think what modern Europe means. In his first book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* Mikhail Gorbachev wrote without the slightest doubt: "We are Europeans." For proof of his statement, he referred to long-standing trade, cultural and political ties and especially to Christianity, the common legacy of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the great philosophical and social doctrines of the 19th and 20th centuries. During his interview to the Ukrainian TV Mikhail Gorbachev, to his own surprise, could not establish his nationality – whether he is a Russian or a Ukrainian. A fashionable word "Eurasia" is now used widely as if to console ourselves: "Look, how vast our country is. It opens the way to Asia."

Poles, Czechs and Hungarians will never renounce their historical and cultural roots of their own free will, whatever happens to them. The man in the street will have to understand the unpleasant truth. Time does not stand still, especially in Europe so desired by him. After four decades of economic and political separation the common civilized legacy alone may prove inadequate for a return to the former home. What can be said about our country then? The legacy of Christianity, Renaissance and Enlightenment has largely been discarded, and seven decades have passed since the country's separation from the common European legacy.

We should not be surprised at the estrangement of our former partners and should not gloat over their troubles and forcibly drag them back into our great Slav brotherhood by which they can now be only frightened to death. We should look for our own ways in the vast world, keeping the doors open if any country decides to join us.

The community is no example for the commonwealth

Dmitry Pogorzhelsky,
from our own correspondent

One time at a reception in Maastricht in honour of the leaders of the countries members of the European Community some food contained salmonellas. The diplomats and journalists who had eaten the bad food got so sick that they had to be taken to the emergency room of a hospital. As you can see, the nasty bacteria didn't acknowledge any difference in social structure, the stomachs of the capitalists and the socialists reacted the same to it, and that was a small consolation. The leaders of Spain and Portugal avoided this danger – 10 years ago when this unpleasant incident occurred these two countries weren't yet members of the European Community.

And now again there is a meeting of the heads of states and governments in Maastricht – a city in Holland. Only now there are already 12 countries. They've been preparing for it all year. This summit was to become decisive for the future of the European Community which put before itself such a grandiose and ambitious goal as creating sort of a single state with all the necessary attributes. Twelve tired men gathered in order to finalize the texts of the agreements on two matters – a single currency and economic unity, and political unity. Is the goal proclaimed by the founders of the EC about to be attained?

When sovereignty is a burden

After two world wars Europe lost its significance and its longtime role as the trend setter in world politics. On the stage there remained two main characters – the USA and the USSR. So one of the goals of the integration was the desire of the Europeans to find a new European "identity," as they say today. Western Europe understood that separation of national states and striving for supremacy only leads to the bloody conflicts which the history of the continent is so rich in. Only a united Europe, which would also serve as barrier to communist expansion, could prevent new ones. Of course the desire to see Europe economically strong, politically stable and democratic was no less important.

In September 1946, Winston Churchill, speaking in Zürich, described the "United States of Europe" in very positive colours unlike Lenin had pictured it. The rise of the Kremlin empire increased the sense of threat and made the Europeans want to unite.

In May 1946 the European Movement was born. And from the very first heated arguments flared between the federalists and the unionists. The first insisted on a union of states on the European continent, the second on a state union. (A familiar argument, but turned around, no?) The bone of contention was having to give up national sovereignity to a certain extent for all-European unity. The outstanding politicians of our century – Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Paul Henri Spaak and Alcide de Gasperi – agreed to put in the Political Declaration that economic and political merging demanded that some national sovereignty be given up. At that time it mainly referred to each country having its own foreign policy as one of the classical signs of sovereignty. Attempts to limit national sovereignty met with resistance more than once in the capitals of the Old World, and the integration went forward mainly economically.



The era of proclaiming national sovereignties comes to its completion in Western Europe

The challenges of the times on the eve of the 1980s – the revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the crisis in Poland and the war in the Falkland Islands – showed that the Community didn't have a set foreign policy or means of dealing with crisis situations. The political weight of the EC was clearly inadequate to its growing economic might, and the world community made demands on it which the EC couldn't meet.

Today the challenges could be more serious than before, affecting the whole world, and again they raise questions demanding quick and clear-cut answers from the Community. The twelve states have come up against a most difficult task – to work out in the near future a single course in foreign policy and provide political security. For that, of course, it's necessary to sacrifice part of their sovereignity, and perhaps even put aside some of their national interests.

The sceptics point to the war in Yugoslavia as a blatant example of the incurable political impotence of the Community. However the Yugoslav crisis doesn't so much confirm the unreality of a single foreign policy of the EC but is a proof of the impossibility of putting an end to internal conflicts from outside. Reason is forgotten in the burst of post-communist anarchy, and economic sanctions have little effect.

Good-bye lire, good-bye francs

Preparation for Maastricht has gone on all year. But the politicians and experts will still have to beat their brains out figuring how to achieve economic unity and a single currency – ECU. Until that happens a market with free movement of labour, goods, services and capital will remain only words. The stalwart antagonist of a single currency, Margaret Thatcher, mainly lost her post because of not wanting to sacrifice the pound for the sake of some ECU. Her successor, John Major, with all his "Europeanism," can't totally ignore the opposition in his own country when it comes to the fate of the pound. In France, Italy, Spain the dispute is still raging too: is it really necessary to part with the franc, lira and the peseta? Even Germany, the most industrious student of the European class,

suddenly became anxious: how can we part with the "treasure of our country?" Yes, the mark isn't only very stable and strong, it's the symbol of Germany, its economic wonder. And nevertheless, Chancellor Kohl who set the tempting goal of going down in history by uniting the two Germanies, did much so that this year's Maastricht would take place and be a great success. The refusal to confirm the political agreement at the current stage could seriously hurt the Community, noted Kohl. Yes, what better argument is there than the 10-year history here in Masstricht.

I'm referring to the collision which was becoming more and more dramatic as December approached and the European capitals were throwing drafts of the agreement at each other in vain. Finally the agitation was crowned by two sleepless nights and the assumption that at such summits hold out great promise, but one must be ready to swallow compromises. All, it seems, are satisfied because the devil which always hides in the details, had almost messed up the participants of the meeting. But it didn't happen: the European integration took new turns and it's pace and landmarks can be counted in months.

The Community took a significant step forward on the way to economic union. But political union is still far off. For doubters that is another trump in the arguments *cons*. The advocates of integration find their *pros*.

If you think it over, the economic unity, and also the single currency which is planned to be used in several years put the resistance to the political union before an accomplished fact, the two lines must inevitably meet and transform into a single policy. If, of course, there isn't a total shake up. That's why Kohl calmly accepted the toasts of the English Tories to their leader who got exceptions for London in the sphere of economics and social policy and stood his ground on certain political problems.

I think, the confidence and Olympic calm of Bonn was due to the fact that Germany understands to whose tune everyone will dance several years from now. Isn't Germany the absolute leader in the EC economically right now? Aren't the German industrial standards (DIN) becoming the mark for all the rest? Isn't the absolutely independent Central European Bank being created similar in form and image to the Federal Bank System, and isn't the ECU taking on all the features of the Deutsche mark? So grumbling about the incorrigible Germans is really no more than admitting the leading role of Bonn in the future European structure. Moreover, London and Paris, which are experiencing serious economic difficulties, are holding on to military attributes symbolizing the status and power of the state. Though this component of security is gradually losing its significance and yielding to other aspects – economic, social, ecological and psychological. And Bonn is ahead in the competition.

And how does Russia, or that alliance that is ripening on one sixth of the land mass, feel about the rise and strengthening of Germany? I think with a feeling of respect and a certain stake on the future role of Germany in the Community, which is turning into a third world power along with the USA and the Asia-Pacific region which is rapidly gaining might. It is in the interests of what will take the place of the USSR that the integration went as fast and successfully as possible and that a united Europe could give more attention to its neighbours who are recovering with such difficulty from the socialist experiment.

But the path to the Community for the future Commonwealth unlike its ex-members is closed. In the middle of December the EC concluded agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia about associated membership that would open customs barriers to goods from these countries to the EC. In the distant future full membership is foreseen, but for now Warsaw, Prague and Budapest have not been accepted, but only given an exam sheet. No matter how difficult the association of the former satellites of Moscow may be, their status helps keep the developing situation under control there and not allow a repetition of the Yugoslav drama.

For the EC the problem of accepting new members is not an easy one. There are those in the Community who are against expanding it. They insist on deepening cooperation. However in the past year they suffered defeat – the Community concluded an agreement with the countries of the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway). Now they too will gain free access to the EC market. Therefore the Community has ruled out the conjecture that the continent would become an impenetrable fortress. That is impossible since, as we know from experience, protectionism is strong where the economy is weak. The EC is dependent from the world market. And security considerations also play a role.



Construction of a Big Europe is the main task of Jaques Delors, 66, Chairman of the Commission of European Communities. It was vastly thanks to his energy and inventiveness that Europe has approached the opportunity to become a great confederation. What will happen to Delors' career then? He is said to have big plans for the future. Chancellor Kohl recently toasted Delors by saying: "The next President of France will be the man who will unite Europe. That's a worthy objective, Jacques!"
Mr Delors' hobbies include biking, jazz and reading the Paris-based paper *l'Equipe*.

Photo from Newsweek magazine (USA)

Is it all the same to us?

A single currency... A single policy... One set of standards... A single legal, economic, and ecological expanse...

Do we care? The full can't understand the hungry. We have problems of a different nature – we can't share the European torments and doubts when the shop counters are empty, it's cold in the houses, there is confusion in the minds and meanness in the souls. That's what some say..

Others, the president of the Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, for instance, consider it a good style to talk about the experience of the EC as an example for the former Soviet republics: on the huge territory there already exists a single economic, legal and other expanse, and a single currency even though it is "wooden." But I don't think such a comparison is right. And the example itself, no matter how good it might seem, isn't appropriate. For the levels of economic development are different. Here there is no market, the level of technology is low and political culture is lacking, there are no democratic institutions. And finally the goals of the would-be conglomeration still haven't been determined.

The Europeans in heading towards something like a megastate are advancing, while

we are regressing to the epoch of national states. In Europe they have understood that the sovereign state has for all purposes outlived itself. The national state is too small to cope with global problems. "We can be sovereign only as a whole," noted the general secretary of the CDU Volker Rühe speaking for Germany. By the way, the most active champions of a single European currency are the Germans, that is the possessors of the most stable money these days. Why should they want it? But they, just the opposite, want to share their sovereignty. No matter how much the opponents of the Brussels bureaucrats grumbled in many European capitals, it is mainly the officials that have determined the policy, say in the sphere of agriculture for quite a few years now. The world won't be any worse should some other attributes of the national state disappear. And the arguments over the amount of integration in the Old World are really arguments over the degree of self-limitation of sovereignty.



Photo from the newspaper Rheinischer Merkur (Germany)

Of course, in the EC there is strong resistence to concentrating power in the "centre," Brussels, where the European bureaucracy has entrenched itself and speaks in its "bird language," and is thought to be far removed from the people. A Kremlin or the Old Square of the Common Market. There's no doubt about the competency of the officials, but it is feared that they could pull too much of the scrap blanklet of the Community over themselves. At London's insistence, they even removed the word "federal" from the Maastricht agreements, since it suggested "centralism." Instead the amorphous concept of "a more tight union" was inserted. But all agreed that the Community must develop further from the bottom up, thus strengthening the democratic basis of the EC.

At times it seems that the geopolitical expanse which the Soviet Union occupied only yesterday, exists outside time and space, having forgotten which millennium we are entering. The West, evidently, will have to reconcile itself to the fact that the former Soviet replublics have to suffer a sovereignty case before understanding that something should be done to be cured of it. The task is to prevent the aggravation of the case when an ambulance has to be called to take them to the emergency room of a hospital, as happened one time during a meeting in Maastricht which has already become a part of history.

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Africa's second liberation

Alexei Kiva,
D.Sc. (History)

Another idol less, this time in Addis Ababa

Photo from Jeune Afrique

Year of Judgement

The Dark Continent sheds the red of Marxism

The victory of Marxism in Africa that the ideologues of the "Red Empire" had hoped for has not come off. Indeed, it could not, for prominent American political scientists rightly noted in the early 1960s that this was the wrong theory in the wrong place.

The erstwhile USSR needed Marxist regimes in the Dark Continent to further its strategic empire-building aims. It needed them as a tool in its political confrontation with the West, as tangible or potential military bases, as sources of valuable raw materials, and last, but not least, as a means of accomplishing world communism's basic objective of securing the global triumph of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

What impelled African leaders to rush into Marxism's embrace? They were obliged to reckon with the popular negative response to colonialism which mass mentality associated with capitalism, or, more broadly speaking, with the Western forms of society's economic, social and political organization, democratic institutes and spiritual values.

At the start of the 1960s the view that prevailed in Africa and, for that matter, not only in Africa, was that socialism with its planned economy and political stability would ensure incomparably higher rates of the growth of production than capitalism. Further, many African leaders proceeded from purely pragmatic considerations in the belief that by recognizing Marxism and Leninism as the state ideology, and declaring loyalty to socialism, the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community would start providing them with massive aid.

The Kremlin "dreamers" artfully prompted that they viewed the example of the USSR, where the peoples of the erstwhile fringes of the tsarist empire, who at the beginning of the 20th century had stood at approximately the same level as the newly free African countries, had within an exceptionally brief span of time, indeed in the lifespan of just one generation, overcome their "ages-old backwardness" thanks to the "socialist choice" and "approached the levels of the world's most advanced states."

So let me ask, who would not wish to see a miracle occur?

Finally, African leaders believed that whatever the option, they never stood to lose, that they would indeed get something from the socialist community plus something more from the West, as inevitably partnering this "tug-of-war." They were proved right.

Nonetheless, the spread in Africa of primitive Marxism along with the emergence of "Marxist regimes" was, to all practical intents, inevita-

ble, had even the USSR done nothing to further that. In effect, this was the result of the swing of the political pendulum. Indeed, during its colonial chapter Africa had experienced the impact of undeveloped capitalism and the embryonic elements of Western democracy. As it had no idea of socialism, it dreamed of it and there was a time when it was fashionable to advocate socialism there.

Stalin, as everyone knows, was the Number One hoaxer of all nations and times. His disciples were no worse. Inasmuch as such clever people as Leon Feuchtwanger and Rabindranath Tagore fell for the "Potyomkin villages" of socialism, what could one expect of the simple-minded African? One can just imagine the enthusiasm and admiration that visits to specially selected collective farms and state farms in the former Soviet national republics evoked. "Good-bye, lucky sons and daughters of Uzbekistan! Good-bye, the land of milk and honey!" I recall some tipsy folk from one African country, crying as, loaded with gifts, they left a "Potyomkin kolkhoz." They had not an inkling about the perishing Aral Sea or about lives mutilated by the cotton monoculture, or about the villagers' identity cards locked in the kolkhoz chairman's strongbox, or about child mortality rates as bad as those in Africa.

Perestroika served to shatter the myths. It transpired that the Soviet Union was not that rich and that its peoples were not that happy. Sinking deeper and deeper into the mire of economic crisis, the Kremlin leaders forgot Africa overnight, the more so as every kopeck counted. Meanwhile in the Dark Continent, the illusions melted like a slim coating of snow.

By the start of the 1990s, it transpired that a mere three decades after independence Africa had shaken off Marxism and the socialist orientation. That last stronghold, the Mengistu Haile Mariam dictatorship in Ethiopia fell in May 1991. Angola and Mozambique rid themselves of the fetters of "scientific" socialism, and the pro-Marxist Kenneth Kaunda regime in Zambia collapsed still earlier.

Would this indicate that we should say good-bye to communism in Africa?

I think it is all slightly more complicated than that. Many African countries are so backward, so poor and so deeply enmeshed in archaic social structures that the Dark Continent will not develop normally unless it gets massive external aid, and follows the capitalist road. As the difficulties accumulate, the political pendulum may swing back again. Some folk will say that capitalism won't do, while socialism didn't work in their countries only because it had been misapplied.

Virtually all the erstwhile colonies and semi-colonies fell "sick" with socialism. In some the "malady" was well-nigh lethal. Why so? After all, not one industrialized country, except for forced "infection," succumbed to the socially murderous virus of Marxist socialism. Why was Africa alone afflicted?

There is much that the erstwhile Soviet Union and the developing countries share in common. This is, for instance, that both in Africa and in this country society is in effect in the traditional pre-bourgeois mould. Hence the overdeveloped team spirit and the completely undeveloped individualism. Hence too, the common "pre-capitalist spirit," as Max Weber put it, which obstructs entrepreneurial initiative. And hence the readiness to be content with the smallest portion in life so long as there "is no war," as most folk say.

In a nutshell, Marxism represents backward traditionalist society's response to modernization, which can only be capitalist. But while Marxism emerged and developed in Western Europe, progress there had put an end to the traditionalist society with its reactionary illusions. In Western Europe, Marxism got nowhere. On the other hand, Russia experienced only a swattering of capitalism in its elementary, painful mode. Traditionalist society is not immune to social pipedreams. Which is why Asiatics and Africans so gullibly believed they could diddle history. Which nobody has yet been able to do.



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Love only up to the barrier

Only recently we thought we would have to rewrite textbooks on history and literature, and delete from curricula social studies, scientific communism and Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, let alone dialectical materialism and historical materialism. Yet we also thought all the other disciplines would remain. However, geography has certainly come a cropper. I have before me a brand new school textbook put out by the Prosveshchenie (Enlightenment) Publishers this year, which, incidentally, merited a prize at the USSR contest of school textbooks. Though terribly boring generally, today it makes fascinating reading. Thus it runs: "The more free time people have, the fact that their work is more intensive and the circumstance that the population has urbanized, have all made for increased recreational requirements... The USSR Constitution guarantees Soviet citizens the right to rest... The Black Sea littoral of the Russian Federation and of the Ukraine and Georgia, plus the Odessa neighbourhood and the Crimean coastline extending from Feodosia to Sebastopol, and finally, Sochi, Sukhumi, Eupatoria and Anapa... comprise nearly one solid zone of health resorts... Of great prize too are the recreation zones along the Caspian shore (in Daghestan and Azerbaijan) and along the shores of the Issyk-Kul Lake."

One is again amused analyzing the "map of economic zones." Here there are no "independent states" at all, not even the very dependent republics. Here the zones extend right and left, while all of us citizens of the absolutely non-dependent and impossibly free countries, are termed in this brand-new textbook "the labour resources of the USSR." That's it. Mitrofanushka, the dullard in Fonvizin's comedy, was absolutely right when he said geography was no subject for the aristocrat.

The said textbook was put to bed in March, but on December 21 of this self-same year, it became totally obsolete. We do not have any more recreational zones, or economic zones, or for that matter, the labour resources of the USSR because that country no longer exists. It has been dissolved and henceforth we have fifteen different states in its boundless territory.

Any geographical change is always an ordeal for that patriotic feeling. Which, incidentally, was noted in the 19th century yet by Saltykov-Shchedrin, the most acrid of the Russian classical authors. Take those two characters in his *A Countryman in St. Petersburg*, the uncle and nephew, who spout such lofty sentiments, about conservatism, Bismarck, cosmopolitanism, and the Fatherland. Though nephew Vania's head is not screwed on the right way, his sentiments are of the loftiest order: "The Fatherland, my dear uncle, is the only thing I recognize!" Plus sundry other highly emotional remarks. How does the uncle respond? He tries to get his nephew restore his emotional balance. "It would be a good idea," he impresses, "to read geography books, as then you'll have a better notion of what you ought to adore. Why, but yesterday the Fatherland of the German ended at Strasbourg, but by now it already incorporates Metz. So, the German will need to love his Fatherland right up to and including Metz, while tomorrow he might come to love his Fatherland right up to and including Paris itself!"

Now tell me, what do Strasbourg and nephew Vania have to do with it all? Has anyone helped the erstwhile Soviet person to regain mental sanity? And up to what and including what are we now to love and adore?

No doubt many are in a quandary. Would it be all right if I speak only about the Rus-



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

What nationals should not worry?

sians? Hopefully, the others won't take affront, will they? Before they did right off, which, generally speaking, was quite understandable. After all, so vast a nation the Russians are, commanding all others, and making all others learn their Russian language. Not now, though. From now on the Russians do not order anyone around.

The Russians find they are having a hard time in the other lands, by which I mean the former Soviet republics. They had always felt at home there, but now it appears that they are merely visitors, guests. Before, they were the majority, the biggest nation in the big Soviet Union. Unnoticeably, they became used to that. But now they suddenly find that they are a national minority in a land populated by another nationality, who comprise the majority. They realize that to feel themselves a national minority is not very pleasant: on the contrary, in many cases it is nasty, even repugnant. Many Russians, who as a result of the USSR's disintegration have found themselves outside Russia and have tasted there unpleasant feelings just mentioned, have come to realize that that was what those poor devils, the Estonians, or the Lithuanians, or the Moldavians, or the Ukrainians felt before. Now they see how hard it had been for them because of us Russians. Now they live accordingly and find it not so bad, after all.

But there are some Russians who take it very, very badly, who simply can't tolerate it. They do not know how and do not want to understand the "indiginous nationality" and are loath to tolerate a minority status. They want to have it as before.

I would advise these compatriots of mine to pay a short visit to Russia. Then they could see for themselves that in no other land is the Russian slighted so much as in Russia herself, that in no other country is the Russian so greatly tongue-lashed as in Russia, that no Moldavian or Lett is so rude, so abrupt, so thievish, and so traitorous with respect to the Russian as the Russian is vis-à-vis the Russian in Russia. After taking a good look at the bare shelves in our Russian shops, at the beggarly, dirty villages, at the darkened cities, they will, hopefully, change their minds and return to their foreign Latvia, Ukraine or Moldova. Hopefully, there they will appreciate their homes more, reckon with their neighbours more, even try to understand their feelings.

What sort of a country are we living in now? Of late the "professional patriot" asks this time and again. As if we shall get the answer at once. After all, we did have the USSR! But what have we got now?

The question is odd, to say the least. Haven't we been living in sovereign Russia ever since June 12, 1990? Haven't we settled down in Russia since January 13, 1991, when the Centre fell on Lithuania, and the Russian President announced on our Russian behalf that Russia was against such aggression? Didn't we have a sigh of relief then to realize that we, thank God, were citizens of Russia? And didn't that sentiment help us then to feel upright?

If not, then in August, during those nightmarishly dark days, when the Centre had fallen upon Russia to strip her of her liberty, her emergent statehood and those normal human relationships which were so slowly developing with such difficulty, didn't all Russians know in what sort of country they are living?

But... up to and including what are we to love and adore? Yakuktia-Sakha? Or Tataria? I for one cannot but love and adore Chechnia, whatever you may say! I need only recall the bearded elders in the square, with their never-ending rally. And I need but recall too what their President, Dudayev, said when our inexperienced chiefs introduced a state of emergency there and then called it off. Do you remember what Djakhar Dudayev said then? He said Russia was still Russia, and was doing what she was used to doing, that one should not feel pained as Russia also had to realize and get used to no longer being an empire, which could not be demanded of her overnight.

So I for one feel for Chechnia, and want nothing to encroach upon its independence. I feel too for the Ingushes, who were evicted from their own land. And I also feel for North Ossetia, whose people are in such torment nowadays, expecting the Ingushes to attack, and troubled for their kith and kin. Does that mean I am a poor patriot?

I feel still more for South Ossetia, which generally is a "strange" land. And also for God-forsaken Karabakh.

So what is one to do? Obey the "professional patriot" and dispatch there, to all those God-forsaken places, Russian soldiers, so as to introduce law and order? No, never, not one Russian soldier must die. These are independent countries, so let them look after themselves by themselves.

As for the "dependent" countries, they too should look after themselves, inasmuch as they qualify any intervention as encroachment on independence.

The situation in South Ossetia makes me feel awkward. But what makes me feel still worse is when it calls on Russia for help. We cannot do that. On the other hand, how can we not do that? But how are we to do that? By killing?

> There are Russians in the Dniester Region, yes Russians! So is Russia then going to leave her sons in the lurch? Yet our eyes turn to Yugoslavia and to what no politician must ever forget. Especially Nikolai Travkin, who was so fond of visiting that country. What brought about what we now have in Yugoslavia? Why is it destroying itself? Croatia declared independence. Its compact Serbian enclave declared autonomy and sought to secede. In this it was backed by Serbia.

No, the frontiers of the former Soviet republics remain steadfast. Yet transparent, as Boris Yeltsin put it. They certainly must be transparent, but at the same time they must be steadfast. My dear fellow Russians in the Dniester Region, get used to living in Moldova. You find it rotten there? Consider yourself slighted? Then I expect my government to invite you to come to Russia. Here we will share our food with you, while there is enough of sky and land for everyone. To involve Russia in a war with Moldova would be a crime.

Why can't we say so straight from the shoulder and tell that to everyone who feels so poorly today in the countries that have become independent? Why? Because until this is said straight out and repeated a thousand and one times in every conceivable fashion, the erstwhile USSR will indeed teeter on the brink of the "Yugoslav option." Only when that is said and repeated a thousand and one times, only when it is clear to everyone, can we put our minds to rest.

We may do that and discard the issue of what we are to love and adore without staring at the geographical map. After all said and done, for the normal human being, at a time when there is peace and there is no war, no alien incursion, the question as to who one is by nationality and up to what city, village, mountain or river, one's patriotism may extend, does not stand on the agenda. Every normal person will evidently love and adore up to and including Kiev, or Strasbourg, or Metz, or Paris, or London and even New York. No doubt the normal human being does not adore hifalutin' bombast. Which I suppose I know only from hearsay.

Tatiana Ivanova

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Yuri Orlov:

"I have always believed in the individual's freedom of choice"

A mane of gray hair and a face expressing determination... I first saw Yuri Orlov in the fall of 1986 when he arrived in New York. At his very first press conference in America he said: "I remember the people in the camps and I shall fight for their release..."

During WWII he worked at a tank factory, then volunteered to join the army, graduated from a military school and served at the front as an officer. After the war he graduated from the Physics Department of Moscow University and worked at the Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics. In the mid 1960s he wrote *Thirteen Questions to Leonid Brezhnev*, which he sent to the addressee and to major Soviet papers. He wrote that the nation needed real democracy and freedom of enterprise. He was expelled from the Party for this. After this incident, he worked in Yerevan, Armenia, and was elected Corresponding Member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. When he returned to Moscow he became one of the organizers of the human rights movement and a founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group. He was arrested on charges of anti-Soviet activity and sentenced to seven years in a labour camp and five years in exile.

Living in the United States, Yuri Orlov is studying physics at the Newman Laboratory of Cornell University. He is a full member of the New York Academy and Chairman of Honour of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. His book *Dangerous Thoughts* has recently been published in the US.

Q. You visited the USSR shortly after the August coup. What has changed there, and what has remained unchanged? Has a new epoch really begun?

A. One of the last citadels of Communism has been destroyed. China remains Communism's last stronghold. Today power in the USSR is in the hands of Democrats, although these are Democrats with a strong inclination towards authoritarianism. There are indications of the much-needed bipartisan system in which radical Democrats will occupy the left wing. Russia has shown that it is ready to start moving towards modern democracy for which freedoms and prosperity are inalienable features. As for the USSR, the empire is falling apart. This disintegration, however, started even before 1917. The only new factor there is that after the 1991 revolution it became possible to avoid civil war in the course of the Union's collapse. This is indeed a great change.

The worst legacy of the former regimes, which leaps to the eye if you compare Russia with the West, is a tremendously underdeveloped infrastructure. In particular, there are no massive service businesses organized on the basis of mutual interests which considerably improve the quality of life, and there is no even any desire or respect for such businesses. In a more general sense, there is no whatever tradition of independent responsible decision-making. The degradation of the individual's initiative stemming from one's will and capabilities is staggering. The average Russian is far behind, say, the average Indian when it comes to readiness to invent and start his own business, to produce something others don't produce or to sell something others don't offer, to make money. If this passivity is not overcome, the Russians will have no choice but to go begging in India.

The psychology of the dissident

Q. Perestroika and the events of the past few months would not have been possible had it not been for the movement of dissidents which undermined the totalitarian system. What was the essence of that movement? What kept it going?

A. There were actually different movements: political ones, like attempts to set up underground parties; nationalist, religious, etc. Religious movements were the strongest, and they even had underground printing shops. The shared concept of the human rights movement, as distinct from the dissidents' movement in general, was that society as a whole and the individual had the right to discuss any ideas expressing various points of view and opinions, with the exception of calls for violence. That concept proved destructive

Shortly before his first visit to Moscow, in May 1988 Ronald Reagan received Yury Orlov: "I told Reagan and Gen. Powell that the main support should go to the people who want to change the system in the USSR, not to those who wish to emigrate, although the latter's problems are very important too"

for the regime. Actually, our demands were broader and they formally included the whole package of international human rights documents, ranging from the UN Declaration of Human Rights to the Helsinki Final Act.

Logically, if the USSR followed our demands, politically it would become very much like modern Western democracies. Naturally, this would have meant the rejection of the cardinal geopolitical ideas of Communism. In this sence the human rights movement was the most destructive one for the regime and the most effective in promoting peace and security. The Helsinki movement used the connection between human rights and international security in order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet leaders. The flow of dissident *Samizdat* literature has over twenty five years educated and shaped a generation of intellectuals, some representatives of the bureaucracy and emancipated workers who accepted the ideas of modern democracy and human rights and were ready to start democratic reforms.

Q. Given the variety of fates and personalities, do you think you could describe the psychological type of the dissident?

A. Dissidents included such lone heroes as KGB captain Victor Orekhov. Human rights groups and underground publishers were also in the movement. Sakharov was among them too, but perhaps it would be better to say that Sakharov was a movement by his own right. Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov did not like it when he was referred to as a dissident. With all this variety, we had only one shared ideological factor: some degree of aversion to Communism.

In 1946 I arrived at the conclusion that our state was a bureaucratic dictatorship. In my first public speech in 1956 I postulated the absence of historical determinism, which gave me the grounds to state that various political systems – from democracy to dictatorship – were possible under both capitalism and socialism. I demanded democracy under socialism. This speech resulted in repressions which hindered my scientific career – I was barred from working in Moscow. It was only in the mid 1960s that I independently arrived at the idea of pluralism, which is essentially the basic idea of the dissident movement. My conclusions were based on analogies with physics. If there is no determinism, this means that there is no common trajectory of historical development, and there is no absolute social theory. Besides, I have always believed in the individual's freedom of choice.

In the early 1970s I made the difficult decision to act on what I speak about, and to speak out what was on my mind. This quality – greater personal integrity, let's say – was the criterion which made dissidents consolidate with each other and around Sakharov, who seemed to have been born with that quality. This integrity also helped us isolate ourselves from the majority of the population living a double or even triple life.

The colleagues

Q. In your book *Dangerous Thoughts* you said the camp bosses allowed you to read scientific works as long as you remained a member of the Armenian Academy. When they expelled you, do you think they were motivated by fear, or perhaps they did not understand that their decision was immoral and illegal?

A. Academy members who voted for my expulsion for political reasons knew that actually they were signing their colleague's sentence! The consequences of their decision were far worse than the ban on reading scientific books. The KGB told me to forget about science. I was denied the right to correspond with my colleagues, to write and receive "letters containing scientific expressions" (for instance, "electrodynamics," or "two plus two equals four"). When I tried to smuggle out an article on logics, I was sent to solitary confinement. After that they kept me in very harsh conditions for two thirds of my term.

Once when they charged me with hooliganism and put into the penalty ward, I was on the verge of despair. I also feared that my wife would be repressed for her having sent one of my scientific articles to the West, there had been such cases before. I wanted to kill myself and I asked the guards to

get me a pair of scissors, but it was Sunday and scissors were nowhere to be found. I managed to overcome the crisis, thus preserving my honour and strengthening my experience. But those who voted for my expulsion in 1979 will not restore their honour.

Q. Now after several years in the US, you can compare your Soviet colleagues with your American ones.

A. Modern Western scientists possessed a much greater feeling of responsibility before history. Soviet scientists, in their turn, had mastered the art of lying to themselves. Soviet scientists had less information and much of what they got to know about the events in their own country is presented in a distorted form. Unprecedented corruption, stagnation of the great depression, tremendous technological backwardness – they had a very vague idea of all these things. Soviet scientists were much more dependent on the state as far as their personal well-being was concerned. They were also scared of and kotowed to the KGB. What would have happened to those who voted against the expulsion? Nothing terrible. The Central Committee would not have sanctioned someone's promotion to full membership. Someone would not have been granted a trip abroad or a new car. Someone would have lost the state subsidies for his scientific programme. Nothing else.

It must be remembered, though, that there were honest people in all social strata. If there had been more of them, the fate of our country would have been different. One thing that is forgotten today is the ideological impasse – if we are against our socialism and another one is unattainable, what are we for then? Capitalism? Impossible! This was quite enough to paralyze one's will."

Predictions

Q. Several years ago you predicted conservative putsch in the USSR. But you did not believe that this country would reach modern democracy within several decades' time. What makes you think so?

A. In nine years, it'll be already the 21st century. Russia will not become a modern democracy in nine years, but it will in twenty years. As for a modern standard of living, it will not be reached even then. Why? One reason is that fixed assets are too old. To replace them with new ones perhaps a trillion dollars will be needed, and that much money doesn't come by itself. Besides, it is impossible to effectively use a trillion even in twenty years. Look at the highways of America and Europe. Look at the phones: you can call any place in the world from any phone booth in any village, thanks to the integrated communication network that connects all civilized countries. Can Russia build all those things?

Look at all the small things that make an American's life so comfortable. Most of these things are unknown in Russia. This means that there is some producer who manufactures them, some seller that offers them on the market, some advertising agent that informs the consumer. Millions of people, about fifty percent of the able-bodied population are engaged in servicing each other.

Now about modern democracy. Parliaments and presidents, freedom of political parties, trade unions and the press – these are only skeleton of modern democracy. Its body is emancipated activity of millions of people, who are guaranteed, under the law, the maximum freedom of autonomy and self-organization. Interference from above is constitutionally limited. This acts as a catalyst for activity of the millions. Russia will eventually arrive at such democracy, but the process will take much time.

Do the democrats know what capitalism is all about?

Q. Speaking to ex-Secretary of State George Shultz, you said that the future of the Soviet Union would be a "confederation of independent states..."

A. That conversation with Shultz took place in May 1988. It became clear later that in the absence of a strong policy from Moscow, the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine would finally break up. However, the United States refused to believe in it until last August, because it just did not want the Soviet Union to break up.

Q. What is your opinion about Mikhail Gorbachev? In your book you wrote that Gorbachev was unable to understand the democratic alternative. However, there are different opinions about Gorbachev. Mikhail Gorbachev, some people insist, understood the "democratic alternative," since he was better informed about the difficulties of overcoming the Bolshevik legacy than anyone of his opponents, either on the left, or on the right. As a result, he had to maneouver and retreat now and then, in order not to lose his cause.

A. It's up to historians to study documents and decide what actually had been the case. I described Gorbachev – a Communist who had enough courage to start reforms and who abandoned the idea of Communism under the pressure of the people and events. Today it is more important to speak about Yeltsin. It is good that Russia has a leader like Yeltsin, but I have to note some features of him which copy the negative features of Gorbachev: his inability to cooperate with Radical Democrats and experienced dissidents in the effort to reshape the existing state structures, his vague understanding of democracy as rigid division rather than harmony of power.

One of the mistakes of the Yeltsin team is that it wanted to work according to a concrete blueprint of economic reform in the context of a changing situation when things and people's psychology are in the state of a flux. In this situation, it would be better to liberalize the economy completely, then to see how things would go, then to apply some control, and then to let things go again. Surprisingly, even the Democrats do not seem to understand that capitalist production that they advocate so much is nothing but a system of economic chain reactions which the West has been able to control to a certain degree. Free market chain reactions are good when you need to fill the market with some product fast, which is impossible under a planned economy.

Q. Will Russia be able to resolve the current crisis without bloodshed?

A. Contrary to the repeatedly voiced expectations, I do not think that there will be any major bloodletting. The people of Russia will have sufficient political wisdom and committment to democracy to avoid violence. It has already demonstrated that it does not want bloodshed anywhere in the former USSR. Russia is less than other nations inclined to resort to extremes in attempts to get out of a conflict. For me it's enough of a guarantee that it will never come to a civil war in this country.

Edgar Cheporov
NEW YORK

The fourth power

Television opens the window to the world, but without a spherical antenna you can't see much out of it

A monopoly on information is immoral. That's the conclusion not only of publicists who know it from their own experience, but the great mathematician Norbert Wiener as well. And there is another widespread observation of the father of cybernetics. If reduced to the maxim it would go: he who owns the press has power. Moreover, that power is over the most important thing in people's lives – their way of thinking and conduct.

During the French Revolution the press was called the "Fourth Power." History confirmed that this was no exaggeration. The might of the mass media steadily grew. Politicians have always either flirted with it or fought it, subordinated it to themselves, abolished it or created their own.

Back as far as thirty years ago the Canadian professor Marshall McLuhan peering into the future of world communications saw the planet Earth as a "global village." It's all very simple: the village is that little world (little homeland), which is accessible through our organs of sense. And when satellite communications through a station orbiting around the Earth were added to the pen, microphone, photo-, cine- and TV cameras, our planet turned into a global village. There are no longer any secrets or mysteries: we learn all about everything immediately just like in a village. Of course we're talking about the new satellite TV. Or about a **vision of the world.**

"Disks on the roofs"

In the 1940s, that is even before McLuhan, the renowned English science fiction writer and futurologist Arthur Clarke predicted (certainly he had been influenced by the ideas of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky) that the satellite communications and the spherical anntenae would become the cause and means of the peaceful transformation of the world. Satellite TV (plus global radio and world phone communications) forms a single information network and creates the prerequisites for the gradual transformation of peoples and nations into **mankind** and interstate borders into an abstraction. Of course that won't be any time soon yet. But it's going to be more and more difficult for any one country as to stop the spread of information.



Demonstrations and strikes swept a number of districts. It can be assumed that further on...

Drawing from the magazine Romanian Life

Every epoch also has its own external signs (you can follow history from the candle to the candelabrum and chandelier or from the stagecoach to the train, car and airplane). The signs of today's landscape of human habitation have become the concave disk having a diameter of a half to one and a half metres. Erected on the roof, balcony or attached to the wall, it is decisively squeezing out its T-shaped predecessor.

Poland is an example for us not only of political and economic transformation, but also of communications. Poland has never been a rich country. And now, after forty years of building socialism, it has hardly become any richer.

But clerks and workers, professors and nouveaux riches, conservatives and progressives, rich people and even those with very modest incomes have become the possessors of the very most modern mass communications systems. If calculated it turns out that the cost of the antenna, convertor and installation comes to three months' pay for someone with an average salary. More exactly three months' pay of the lady who cleans our house. It's another matter that she doesn't think about such a luxury as yet, but how to make ends meet.

Nevertheless satellite TV is rapidly becoming a mass phenomenon here. As a sociologist would say, it draws an undifferentiated audience. Though there are no exact statistics, the impressive figure of more than a million was given.

That means every tenth family is now a part of world communications.

Perhaps I first sensed and evaluated this force during the August events when life went in spurts from information to information. The decrees of the Emergency Committee, set in the harmonies of Tchaikovsky and the pleasant recording of *Swan Lake* (a perfect example of blocking information), were corrected non-stop by the information relayed via satellite by CNN and BBC as well as by tens of other channels of satellite TV. Radio Liberty also worked around the clock.

It was satellite TV that really broke through the information blockade in the USSR.

Goods and power

More than two dozen communications satellites circle over Europe now. In the Polish weekly *Pawie Oko* some 45 satellite TV programs are advertised. Across the ocean there are even more. It's no accident: evidentally every third American feels that his political views are mainly influenced by TV. And TV information today, with its global coverage and broadcasts, is already claiming the role of worldwise crier.

The USA dominates in the many-themed and various-genred information world (or if you like, market). Two thirds of the broadcasts in this market are American: 75 percent of the TV programs, more than 80 percent of the information about events, around 90 percent of the computerized data, 65 percent of trade advertisements and half of the films. The world has really become a global village, and is more and more taking on the characteristics of an American village. And the indisputable leader here, if you're speaking about documentaries and electronic journalism is CNN. It's round the clock information programs are watched by 60 million viewers in 91 countries. And the American billionaire from Seattle, Ted Turner is inevitably becoming one of the most influential people in the world. He has again shown (and proved) that an uninterrupted flow of information on the screne about the world, flooding the world – is **power.** But the information which is ahead of that of its competitors, and accurate. Therefore it is prestigious. Just take one example. During the American intervention in Panama Eduard Shevardnadze went to the Moscow office of CNN and announced the statement of the Soviet government before its cameras. It was announced by TASS and other information agencies only a couple of hours later.

Why do I mention this? Because with the current economic crisis, the political disorder and uncertain future of the state it's worth remembering about the civilized perspective as well as about the possibility of a new information blockade. And mankind so far hasn't thought up anything better for overall informativeness as well as for deblocking information than satellite TV: it is autonomous like the short wave radio but it's harder to damp the signal (it wasn't happenstance that in our Soviet draft of the convention on satellite TV presented at the UN in 1972, there was a point about the liquidation of satellites in space if the programmes translated by them were felt to be interference in the internal affairs of our country).

Alternatives, even a hint at pluralism or competition were always feared here and any attempt to deal with this problem, even theoretically, was punished. I can cite myself as an example. Sergei Lapin, a minister and member of the CC CPSU and the long time chairman of Gosteleradio of the Brezhnev years, deprived the seditious author of the book *The Television Program* of the chance to get anything published for a good ten years. In this book I mentioned, in passing, inevitability of competitive, multiprogram, and then global TV.

May we not get stuck by the wayside...

The state monopoly on TV has been fought in various ways around the world. Americans right away in the 1940s commercialized it and made it independent from the government. In Europe the process took several years during which different approaches were tried.

In order to free television in England from the long time sway of the state corporation BBC, networks were set up in the mid-1950s on a commercial basis like that in America with advertising giving it independence. The French took a different route: after the youth riots in 1968 and the long parliamentary battles they set about breaking up the state monopoly and introducing independent networks. Each station had its own administration, staff, finances and equipment. The competition, it is generally agreed, gave excellent results. The Scandinavians (Sweden, Norway) staked on satellite programs being a serious alternative to state ones. The state TV workers admit that it gives them constant headaches, but the viewers are delighted.

None of these approaches is entirely suitable for our large country. But we could combine them and get a promising program bringing us nearer to the **world information network.** There's only one reservation: if our TV becomes dependent on the viewer who – in part – will pay for the programs. That is, he will become a subscriber as is the case with many (if not a majority) civilized countries.

The first step is competition between stations. That means the independence of all the 4-5 existing channels. That should be followed by the creation of independent commercial (not the content, but the financing) programs whose sponsors may be any advertisers. It is generally acknowledged that TV advertisements are the most effective and costly. Evidently Menatep, MMM and the All-Russian Trade Exchange will take over here first...

But parallel and inevitably, even with all our difficulties, satellite TV will develop and expand in our country. It'll be the crown of our TV *perestroika.* We're no poorer than our neighbour Poland! The conversion of the defence enterprises could become the most blatant, if not deciding stimulus here: the disks with the converter are a profitable item to make (Polish experience bears this out). And if there is mass production they will be easily available (in Poland the price fell from 1,500 to 400 dollars in just 3-4 years). Then it wouldn't be a sin to turn to Ted Turner for know-how and help...

Prof. *Rudolf Borecki,*
our own correspondent
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

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

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Yuri Ryzhov, 61-year-old rector of the Moscow Aviation Institute and a champion of perestroika, has been appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to France. According to some information, the decree on his appointment was signed by President Gorbachev on December 5, and three days later the Minsk agreement of the leaders of the Slav republics virtually put an end to the existence of the Soviet Union. It is not known now what country Ryzhov will represent in France. In a conversation with a *New Times* reporter Yuri Ryzhov did not comment on the subject and asked that no inquiries be made "until the situation is cleared up."

Academician Ryzhov, who till recently headed the Soviet parliament's committee on science, public education, culture and upbringing, was to replace the career diplomat Yuri Dubinin, who behaved "improperly" during the August coup. Several months ago Dubinin was recalled to Moscow for "consultations" and did not return to Paris.

* * *

"Diplomacy is a basket with eggs, not a basket with stones," as Dr **Herrit Olivier,** head of the South African consulate in Moscow, likes to say. He will have to establish and develop cooperation between our countries, which restored consular relations after a 35-year interval. Dr Olivier is sure that in spite of long isolation from each other the Russians and South Africans have a kindred spirit. During the Anglo-Boer war in the beginning of the century Russian soldiers fought on the side of the Boer rebels.

Herrit Olivier was born in a rural area into a family with a rather modest income. His dream of becoming a farmer was not to be realized. His mother talked him out of this idea. She wanted her son to have a career. And so Herrit went to night school. Then he entered the university and defended two theses. He wrote much about politics and earned a reputation at home for his liberal views. "I have always believed there must be an alternative to apartheid," he said, "and I am very glad that South Africa now adheres to international morals."

Emigration is one of the topical issues of bilateral relations between Russia and South Africa. How is Dr Olivier going to settle the problem?

The consul thinks that first of all the potential emigrants who think of South Africa as a "land of milk and honey" (an expression used by former President Pieter Botha) should abandon their illusions. "South Africa is indeed a land of great opportunities, but first of all we bear responsibility for South Africans," the consul says. "I cannot accept the idea of people from other countries coming to South Africa and taking jobs away from the native population. At the same time our doors are open to highly skilled specialists, those who can start a business, build a factory or laboratory, thereby providing additional jobs for South Africans."

Y. Korneyeva

* * *

Nina Beilina, the founder of the world's only Bach festivals and a winner of the international Tchaikovsky, George Enescu and Jacques Thibaud competitions, is expected to come to the Dyagilev festival in St. Petersburg.

Nina left the Soviet Union in 1976. "Russia has lost and America has gained." The *New York Times* commentary on her debut in the United States was followed by enthusiastic reviews in other American newspapers and an invitation to teach at the Mannes College of Music in New York.

Nina Beilina dreamed all her life of holding a Bach festival in Russia. She was able to do that only in the United States

Different Kinds of liberals

Vladimir Bogachev, at left in the photo, is the leader of the European Liberal Democratic Party. He warns against confusing his party with the "Liberal Democrats" of Zhirinovsky. "We are not going to change the name of our party because of 'the pranks of this gentleman'", Bogachev says. Liberalism and democracy are real values and adherence to them must be reflected in the name of the political organization.

Asked whose interests his party represents, Bogachev replied that it reflects primarily the interests of small and middle business. A specific feature of the parlty is to become "the political physiognomy" of those who inherited the Russian business traditions by combining them with a clearly European orientation which is recorded in the party's name. In addition, the party actively seeks contacts with liberal parties in European countries or with their international associations. Unfortunately, Zhirinovsky has considerably bungled Bogachev's plans in this respect.

Though Vladimir Bogachev does not shun business activity himself, he believes that the spheres of economy, policy and social activity should be divided. His party is raising a special fund for this purpose. Its aim is to provide social assistance, restore monuments, and conduct educational and research work. Till now this has been done by the party bodies which take care of the Konstantin Paustovsky Museum (an eminent Russian novelist), act as patrons of the Sveshnikov choir, and give assistance to another Moscow choir conducted by Andrei Kozhevnikov. From now on all this will be done by the fund. Competing with the late Maxwell's company the fund is also launching an European newspaper. It is simply called *Evropa.*

A professional musician, composer and the author of many popular songs, Vladimir Bogachev spent two years in prison in Moscow for "anti-Soviet activity." While taking part in liberal circles he met with **Yevgeny Glazkov,** now the editor of the newspaper *Evropa.* Glazkov is 45, two years younger than Bogachev. A professional journalist, he became known two years ago during the strike of a town newspaper in Noginsk, near Moscow. The staff of the newspaper was protesting against the actions of the local party bosses.

in May of 1988. Nina has organized a chamber orchestra of 16 young musicians from America and Europe. Since then she has travelled with them around the world to her Bachanalia festivals. Next year Beilina is coming to Moscow with her orchestra.

On December 27 Nina Beilina will perform with the Russian symphony orhestra Sankt-Petersburg Kamerata in the grand hall of the St. Petersburg Philharmonic Society.

A. Pyasetskaya

* * *

Gu Yue, 52-year-old Chinese film actor, has played only one part during his artistic career. But this was enough to make him famous throughout the country. High party and government officials of China often invite Gu Yue to dinners. In the street he wears dark glasses and a straw hat in the hope that he will not be recognized.

Gy Yue is the best known of the four actors to whom the Communist Party entrusted the role of the "father of the nation," Mao Zedong. During the past 11 years the actor has played Mao in 27 films, including the latest "masterpiece" of the series "Decisive Battles," which has not yet been completed. He portrayed Mao in different periods of his "glorious path." Gu Yue has had to make sacrifices in order to look like the "great helmsman" in those periods. For instance, he had to lose 11.5 kg when he acted in the series depicting the early years of the Chinese leader.

Gu Yue is not a professional actor. In 1978, when he was serving in the People's Liberation Army, he was among the 40 candidates chosen for the part of Mao because he looked very much like the great leader. "My heart skipped a beat at the very thought of whom I would have to play," Gu recalls. Fully aware of his responsibility, he studied all of Mao's works and articles and learned by heart the *Little Red Book*, the collection of Mao's quotations.

Asked whether he has tired of playing one and the same role, Gu Yue merely shrugs. "I am a party member and therefore can't refuse," he says.

* * *

Millions of people in the Soviet Union and abroad know **Yekaterina Mozhayeva** as clown Antoshka, a mischievous red-haired boy. For 20 years she has charmed the young and the old with her superb gift of improvisation and her extraordinary rope-walking and juggling.

Yekaterina was born in the faraway Siberian city of Kemerovo. While studying at school she decided to become an actress and attended ballet classes for gifted students. Family troubles and her failure to enter the Moscow circus school did not prevent her from pursuing her desire to work in the circus.

Her performances in Europe, Asia and South America were successful while her participation in the prestigious festival of "stars" of world art, anually held under the aegis of Italian television, was a sensation. For the first time in the history of this gala-show, circus art was represented by a Soviet actor, who won the international grand prize for 1991.

A. Kuhn

Charity is her mission

What should the wife of a politician do? The wives of American presidents, for instance, traditionally head campaigns and movements for the solution of some social problems such as the struggle against drugs or illiteracy, and help for alcoholics or the homeless. **Olga Murasheva** believes that she had found her vocation in the field of charity. She is the wife of Arkady Murashev, who was appointed three months ago as the chief of Moscow's main police department. At present Olga heads the charitable Maria Society.

She met her husband at Moscow Higher Technical College, where she and Arkady studied in the same group in the department of power plant engineering. Upon graduation Olga worked for nine years as a design engineer in a defence-related institute. She has unpleasant recollections of this time. Several times she tried to leave the institute and find a job to her liking. A chance appeared when Arkady Murashev was elected a people's deputy of the USSR. Olga understood that she must support her husband in political affairs. This is how the idea of founding the Maria Society arose.

The society is sponsored by new Moscow employers who represent private business – the Trinity society with limited responsibility and the Zhenshen (Ginseng) cooperative. It was a real ordeal to have the new organization registered officially, to provide a stamp and find premises for it. Officials tried to offiliate the Maria Society with some official bodies – the Red Cross, the social security department or the executive committee of the local council – while Olga wanted it to be an independent charitable institution of private entrepreneurs. The name of Murashev, a radical, hindered Olga's efforts, and progress became possible only after the August coup.

The first major action of the society was aid to the families of 55 Soviet policemen killed during the performance of their duties. The weekly newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and Facts), the Russ-commodity-raw materials exchange, the bank association Menatep, and the Grast joint-stock society took part in this effort. It was conducted with tact and dignity, without unnecessary emotions or pathos. Olga, the president of the Maria Society, found the right tone.

"It is not important what impels the entrepreneurs who donate their money. Perhaps it is ambition, the desire to publicize their firm, or mercantile considerations," Olga says. "Most often all three motives are combined. But, in one way or another, they do good and the public should appreciate their action.

Strictly speaking, the text published below is not a manuscript of the type usually carried under this rubric. These fragments are not an example of profound philosophical or scientific reflections. There is no denying, however, that they are serious reflections, for intelligence, so close to the political sphere, also has its philosophy. Allen W. Dulles (1893–1969) headed the Central Intelligence Agency for a long time. He is regarded as a co-founder of "the philosophy of the American special service." He set out the basic principles of this service in his book *The Art of Intelligence*, which lis to appear next year in the series of memoirs of master spies. Books by R. Gehen and. W. Colby will also be put out in the series.

Excerpts from *The Art of Intelligence* published below show how the Western special services exploited the desire of people in totalitarian state for freedom and a better life. These people are usually poor and unfortunate, drag out a slavish or dependent existence and therefore are often tempted to change their living conditions and leave their country. It can be asked, however, whether such a step is justified by so high a price. Secret service men do not think much about that. Psychology and other sciences, scientific methods of the analysis of society and policy are only means of achieving their political and strategic aims. They naturally exploit fully the weaknesses of the social system of the opponent.

Compiled by
Vitaly Chernyavsky

Volunteers

Allen Dulles

The piercing of secrets behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains is made easier for the West because of the volunteers who come our way. We don't always have to go to the target. Often it comes to us through people who are well acquainted with it. While this is not a one-way street, the West has gained far more in recent years from volunteers than its opponents have. A reason for this change, in addition to Hitler's demise, is the growing discontent with the system inside the Soviet Union, the satellite nations and Communist China, and some relaxation of the controls of Stalin's day. People know more, and they want more and they travel more.

These volunteers are either refugees and defectors who cross over the frontiers to us or they are people who remain "in place" in order to serve us from within the Communist societies.

Information from refugees is often piecemeal and scattered, but for years it has added to our basic fund of knowledge, particularly about the Soviet satellites in Europe. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 sent over a quarter of a million refugees fleeing westward. They brought us up to date on every aspect of technical, scientific and miltary achievement in Hungary and gave us an excellent forecast of likely capabilities for years to come. Among the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have come over from East Germany, other satellites and Communist China since the end of World War II, many have performed a similar service.

The term "defector" is often used in the jargon of international relations and intelligence to describe the officials or highly knowledgeable citizens, generally from the Communist Bloc, who leave their country and come to the West. It is, however, a term that is resented, and properly so, by persons who repudiate a society which they leave in order to join a better one.

I do not claim that all so-called defectors have come to the West for ideological reasons. Some come because they have failed in their jobs; some because they fear a shake-up in the regime may mean a demotion or worse; some are lured by the physical attractions of the West, human or material. But there is a large band who have come over to us from Communist officialdom for highly ideological reasons. They have been revolted by life in the Communist world and yearn for something better Hence, for these cases I use the term "defector" sparingly and then with apology. I prefer to call them "volunteers."

If the man who comes over to us belonged to the Soviet hierarchy, he may well know the strengths and weaknesses of the regime, its factions, its inefficiencies and its corruption. If a specialist, he would know its achievements in his chosen field. Volunteers may be soldiers diplomats, scientists,engineers, ballet dancers athletes and, not infrequently, intelligence officers. Behind the Iron Curtain there are many dissatisfied persons unknown to us who seriously consider flight. Some of them hesitate to take the final step, not because they have qualms about forsaking an unsatisfying way of life, but because they are afraid of the unknowns that await them.

The answer to this is to make it clear that they are welcome and will be safe and happy with us. Every time a newly arrived political refugee goes on the air over the Voice of America and says he is glad to be here and is being treated well, other officials behind the Iron Curtain who were thinking of doing the same thing will take heart and go back to figuring out just how they can get themselves appointed as trade representatives in Oslo or Paris. Short-term visitors to the West from the Soviet Bloc would probably volunteer in far greater numbers were it not for the Soviet practice of often keeping wives and children behind as hostages.

Oleg Lenchevsky, the Soviet scientist who sought asylum in Britain in May of 1961 while he was studying there on a UNESCO fellowship, tried in vain to get Khrushchev to permit his wife and two daughters, whom he had left behind in Moscow, to leave the country and join him. His personal appeal, in the form of a letter to Krushchev, was published in many Western newspapers Khrushchev, of course, did not relent. He couldn't because he well knew that if he ever let Lenchevsky's family out of Russia, it would only set off a wave of defectors with families, all in hopes of the same treatment.

I believe that, given a free opportunity to leave, the number of people who today would move out from behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains would be, without exaggeration, astronomical. The total from the end of World War II until the end of 1961, the year the Berlin Wall went up, was over 11 million.

The Communists will go to great lengths to prevent the defection of any person whom they regard as "valuable" to them or of possible use to us. Western scientists at international conferences attended by Soviet and satellite delegations have frequently tried to start friendly conversations with one or another of the members of such delegations decked out as chemists or meteorologists, only to stumble upon the one man who does not know the first word about the subject in which the delegation was supposed to be expert. He is the KGB security man who has been sent along solely for the sake of keeping an eye on the *bona fide* scientists in the delegation, to see that they don't talk out of turn and, above all, that they don't make a break for freedom.

The Chinese Communists carefully limit the amount of fuel in the tanks of their military planes before the latter go on training missions or manoeuvres so that a pilot who might take it into his head while aloft to steer for Formosa and freedom cannot reach his goal.

Intelligence is a delicate sphere of activities. It conceals its weapons, but it must have its philosophy, too

On the other hand, the fate of some who have gone from our side over to the Soviets would not serve as a particularly good advertisement for further defections in that direction. Some of them recently have talked to Western visitors and have admitted, without prompting, that their lot is an unhappy one and that they have no future. The scientific defectors, like the atomic physicist Pontecorvo, who continue to be useful to the Soviets in their technological efforts, seem to fare better than the others, and sometimes even receive high honours, as Pontecorvo recently did when he received the Lenin Prize. The Burgesses and MacLeans, the Martins and Mitchells, have had their day of publicity and now eke out a dull living, some as "propaganda advisers."

Often "defectors" from the Communist side are not exactly what they seem. Some, for example, have been working as agents "in place" behind the Curtain for long periods of time before defecting and only come out because they or we feel that the dangers of remaining inside have become too great.

Some very helpful and important defectors have been diplomats or intelligence officers under diplomatic cover. It is, of course, a relatively simple matter for them while posted abroad in a free country to walk out of their jobs one fine day and go to the Foreign Office of the country to which they are accredited or a Western embassy and request protection. In the West, whenever this happens and when the motives of the defecting diplomat appear to be bona fide, the requested protection and material assistance needed until the diplomat can find a new livelihood in his new home are usually granted.

If there is any hesitancy in extending these privileges, it is because the Soviets have from time to time mounted phony defections, which is rather an unsatisfactory way of planting an agent but may have incidental benefits. The phony "defector," when interviewed by persons in the country to which he has "defected," may pick up and be able to send back a certain amount of information, especially concerning what is known or not known about his own country. A further and final step in such phony defections is that the defector may eventually "redefect." One day he will announce that he is disillusioned with the West, that it is not as represented, he repents of his sins and wants to go home even if he is to be punished for his original defection. This provides some propaganda repercussion, is embarrassing to the country of haven, and is a convenient way for the defector, who was really an agent, to return home and report on the information he has been assembling.

Soviet and satellite intelligence officers, like the diplomats, also have the advantage of posts and of trips abroad and some use such occasions to make the break they may long have beeen contemplating. Their defections are regarded as most serious losses by the Soviets. They may go to great lengths to prevent such defections from happening, even to using violence to force the return of a potential defector, not to mention reprisals of various kinds should the defection succeed or the defector's family remain under Soviet control.

The reader may recall the sensational news photos in 1954 which showed a Soviet goon squad strong-arming the wife of defector Vladimir Petrov, KGB Chief in Australia, in an attempt to get her on a plane and take her back to Russia against her will. Only the quick intervention of the Australian police saved Mrs. Petrov from being abducted.

For these reasons the defection of intelligence officers is often carried out with much less fanfare than those of more public personages like diplomats or scientists. The Soviet or satellite intelligence officer also usually has the advantage of knowing in some degree how to get in touch with his "opposite numbers" in the West. After all, part of his job was to probe for such information. When he picks up and leaves, it is likely that he will head for a Western intelligence installation rather than for a diplomatic establishment or the nearest police station because he can be fairly certain of his welcome there and that his defection will be handled most securely.

The defection of a staff intelligence officer of the opposition is naturally a break for Western counterintelligence. It is often the equivalent, in the information it provides, of a direct penetration of hostile headquarters for a period of time. One such intelligence "volunteer" can literally paralyze the service he left behind for months to come. He can describe the internal and external organization of his service and the work and character of many of his colleagues at headquarters. He can identify intelligence personnel stationed abroad under cover. Best of all, he can deliver information about operations. Yet he may not know the true identity of a large number of agents for the reason that all intelligence services compartmentalize such information. No one knows true identities except the few officers intimately concerned with a case.

The West has been singularly fortunate in having many such defectors come over to its side in the course of recent history. In 1937 two of Stalin's top intelligence officers stationed abroad defected rather than return to Russia to be swallowed up in the purge of the NKVD, which followed the purges of the party and of the Army. One was Walter Krivitsky, who had been chief of Soviet intelligence in Holland. He was found dead in a Washington hotel in 1941, shot presumably by agents of the Soviets who were never apprehended. The story that he committed suicide seems most unlikely. The second was Alexander Orlov, who had been one of the NKVD chiefs in Spain at the time of the Civil War. Unlike Krivitsky, he has managed to elude Soviet vengeance and has published a number of

books, one on Stalin's crimes and another on Soviet intelligence.

An early postwar Soviet defector was Igor Gouzenko, who was a military intelligence officer in charge of codes and ciphers in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Thanks in some measure to clues he brought with him, part of the international atomic spy ring which the Soviets had been running during and after the last years of the war was uncovered.

Among the major defectors to the West at that time were Vladimir Petrov, Yuri Rastvorov, an intelligence officer stationed at the Soviet mission in Japan; and Peter Deriabin, who defected from his post in Vienna. All these men had at some time been stationed at intelligence headquarters in Moscow and possessed valuable information that went far beyond their assignments at the time they defected. Deriabin later told his story in a book called *The Secret World.*

There can be much immoral in the activity of special services. But who can say for sure whether the desire for freedom can be exploited?

In recent years two defections of a special kind have involved Soviet intelligence personnel employed on assassination missions. Nikolay Khokhlov was sent from Moscow to West Germany in early 1954 to arrange for the murder of a prominent anti-Soviet émigré leader, Georgi Okolovich. Khokhlov told Okolovich of his mission and then defected. At Munich in 1957, Soviet agents tried without success to poison Khokhlov. In the fall of 1961, Bogdan Stashinski defected in West Germany and confessed that on Soviet orders he had murdered the two Ukrainian exile leaders Rebet and Bandera some years earlier in Munich.

Recently, Soviet diplomat Aleksandr Kaznacheev defected in Burma, where he had been stationed in the embassy. While Kaznacheev was not a staff member of Soviet intelligence, he was a "coopted worker" and was used in intelligence work whenever his position as a diplomat enabled him to perform certain tasks with less risk of discovery than his colleagues in the intelligence branch.

All the important intelligence "volunteers" have not been Soviets. Numerous high-ranking staff officers have defected from the satellite countries and were able to contribute information not only about their own services but about Soviet intelligence as well. Whatever impression of independence European satellite governments may try to give, they are, in matters of espionage, satrapies of the USSR. When agents of the satellite services come over to the West, they are a window on the policies and plans of the Kremlin.

Joseph Swiatlo, who defected in Berlin in 1954, had been chief of the departments of the Polish intelligence service which kept tabs on members of the Polish Government and the Polish Communist party. Needless to say, he knew all the scandal about the latter, and the Soviets had frequently consulted with him.

Pawel Monat had been Polish militarty attaché in Washington from 1955 to 1958, after which he had returned to Warsaw and was put in charge of worldwide collecton of information by Polish military attachés. He served in this job for two years before defecting in 1959. We will hear more of him later on.

Frantisek Tisler defected in Washington after having served as Czech military attaché there from 1955 to 1959. The Hungarian secret police officer, Bela Lapusnyik, made a daring escape to freedom over the Austro-Hungarian border in May 1962, and reached Vienna in safety, only to die of poisoning, apparently at the hands of Soviet or Hungarian agents, before he could tell his full story to Western authorities.

The Chinese defector, Chao Fu, who had been serving as the "security officer" in the Red Chinese Embassy in Stockholm until he "disappeared" in 1962, was one of the first openly publicized cases of a defection from the Chinese Communist State Security Service. There are others.

When one studies the role the intelligence services play in the Soviet world and their closeness to the centres of power, it is no surprising that the Soviet intelligence officer gets an inside look, available to few, of the sinister methods of operation behind the façade of "socialist legality." To the intelligent and dedicated Communist, such knowledge comes as a shock. One defector has told us, for example, that he could trace the disillusionment which later led to his own defection back to the day when he found out that Stalin and the NKVD, and not the Germans, had been responsible for the Katyn massacre (the murder of about ten thousand Polish officers during World War II). The Soviet public still does not know the truth about this or most of the other crimes of Stalin. But once a man is aware of realities, "loss of faith" in the system within which he is working, coupled often with personal disappointments, seem to be the powerful driving factor in defections.

The names mentioned here by no means exhaust the list of all those who have left the Soviet intelligence service and other Soviet posts. Some of the most important and also some of the most recent defectors have so far chosen not to be "surfaced," and for their own protection must remain unknown to the public. They are making a continual contribution to the inside knowledge of the work of the Soviet intelligence and security apparatus and to exposing the way in which the subversive war is being carried on against us by Communism.

The United States in particular has always been a haven for those seeking to leave tyranny and espouse freedom. It will always have a welcome for those who do not wish to continue to work for the Kremlin.

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